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If displacement is happening then I would say that's all the more
reason why other areas should take on this model. Let's drive
people out to Lincolnshire and into the sea.
-Alan Given, Chief Executive
of the Crime and Drugs Partnership1
I. INTRODUCTION.

Globalization is on the rise. The last few decades have been
marked by dramatic reductions in transaction costs that have helped
bring together local markets. Technological advances such as wireless
telecommunications and the Internet have connected buyers and
sellers of goods and services across the planet through transactions
that were not even feasible, let alone cost-effective, as little as a
decade ago. No less importantly, the systematic removal of regulatory
barriers to international trade has facilitated economic globalization.
At the forefront of international economic liberalization, the creation
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") 2 in 1995 extended
multilateral trading rules beyond trade in goods to cover transnational
provision of services, protection of intellectual property rights, and

1.
City's Blitz is Pushing Crime into the County, NOTTINGHAM EVENING POST (Eng.), July
3, 2007, at 10.
2.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144-53 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
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technical and health-related standards. 3 Hundreds of Regional Trade
Agreements ("RTAs") that further reduce barriers 4 are complemented
by an even greater number of international investment protection
5
agreements called Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs").
In the shadow of these economic developments, the same period
has also witnessed the rise of transnational crime (roughly defined as
serious crime whose perpetration and effects occur in more than one
state) 6 as a source of grave concern around the globe. 7 Drug
smuggling, arms trading, human trafficking, illegal sex trade, money
laundering, wholesale intellectual property rights infringementthese and other illicit activities 8 have flourished due to the advances of
3.
For analysis of the political economy of the WTO, see KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W.
STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2005); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT L. HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (3d ed. 2005).
4.
For a report on the proliferation of RTAs, see Roberto V. Fiorentino, Luis Verdeja &
Christelle Toqueboeuf, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006 Update
(WTO Discussion Paper No. 12, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res.e/bookspe/discussion-papersl2ae.pdf.
5.
On the increase in the number of BITs over the last few decades and analyses of their
economic effects, see Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1568-71 (2005);
Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811 (2006).
6.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 3(2), opened
for signature Nov. 15, 2000, entered into force Sept. 29, 2003, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 [hereinafter CATOC]. The CATOC defines an offense as
"transnational" if:
(a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is committed in one State but a
substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in
another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal
group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed
in one State but has substantial effects in another State.
Id. The juridical significance of' this definition is limited to the purpose of delimiting the
CATOC's scope of application; the relevance of its different elements to our analysis varies, but it
is, in any case, a useful starting point.
7.
As will be evident below we do not restrict our analysis to activities that are universally
defined as criminal. Indeed, it is the very existence of different national approaches that enables
the dynamic theory we present. Thus, it may be sufficient for a given profit-driven activity to be
criminalized, or de-criminalized (either de jure or de facto), in a single national jurisdiction to
trigger transnational crime shifting and the subsequent dynamic policy responses by other
jurisdictions.
8.
The CATOC does not list the types of crimes that may be regarded as "transnational."
Generally it applies to serious crimes "punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at
least four years or a more serious penalty." CATOC, supra note 6, art. 2(b). The Fourth United
Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems listed the following
categories of transnational crime: money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of art and cultural
objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit trafficking in arms, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy,
land hijacking, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons,
trade in human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal
business, corruption and bribery of public officials or party officials and elected representatives,
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technology and the freer movement of goods, services, money, and
people that characterize the modern world, just as legal international
business transactions have flourished. There are, no doubt, direct
links between technological progress and economic liberalization, on
the one hand, and the growth of transnational crime and the
accompanying anxiety, on the other hand. For example, illegal child
pornography became easier to distribute via the Internet, 9 and the
removal of barriers to international trade in goods and the free flow of
funds may have facilitated cross-border trafficking in illicit drugs. 10
As such, transnational crime is indeed "the dark side of
globalization,"1 1 and it is not surprising that national governments
and law enforcement agencies worldwide have increasingly turned to
international law and international cooperation to fight it,
considerably augmenting the international legal field of global crime
control. 12 However, as leading transnational crime experts Peter
Andreas and Martin Nadelmann note in a recent book, it is an all too
common generalization to view "the growth of international crime
control as simply a natural and predictable response to the explosive

and other offenses committed by organized criminal groups. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.169/15/Add.1
(Apr. 4, 1995).
9.
See, e.g., Patrick Forde & Andrew Patterson, Paedophile Internet Activity, AUSTL. INST.
CRIMINOLOGY: TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUSTICE, Nov. 1998, at 2-3, available at
http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Paedophile%201nternet%2OActivity.pdf
(charting
the
transformation of child pornography by new technologies, with an emphasis on the transnational
dimension); Anna Grant, Fiona David & Peter Grabosky, Child Pornographyin the DigitalAge, 3
TRANSNAT'L ORGANIZED CRIME 171 (1997) (same).

10. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Free Trade Pact a Boon to Drug Dealers, UCLA TODAY, May 22,
2001, available at http://www.today.ucla.edu/portal/ut/010522freetrade.aspx (last visited Apr. 7,
2009) (suggesting that economic liberalization can fuel international trade in drugs).
11. Melvin Levitsky, The Dark Side of Globalization, 5 INT'L STUD. REV. 253, 253-54 (2003).
Arguably, there are other "dark sides" to globalization, such as the negative distributional effects
of global trade liberalization. See Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of
Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the World Trade
Organization, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 221, 246-59 (2006) (discussing areas of the WTO
where the dissonance between "function and aspiration is most acute").
12. Global crime control is not an entirely new area-the International Criminal Police
Organization, better know as Interpol, dates back to 1923, but was ineffective during World War
II when it fell under Nazi control, remaining moribund until its reestablishment in 1956. For a
history of Interpol, see Interpol History, http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/governance
/sg/history.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). Moreover, international governmental activity in the
field has gained considerable momentum since the 1990s, as attested by the young age of the
CATOC and other international arrangements such as the Forty Recommendations of the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF'), originally agreed upon in 1990, but
significantly updated in 2003 and 2004. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE

FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS
(2004), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40
/34849567.PDF. For an evaluation of the FATF, see Jackie Johnson & Y.C. Desmond Lim, Money
Laundering:Has the FinancialAction Task Force Made a Difference?, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 7 (2003).
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growth of transnational crime." 13 The interaction between
globalization, transnational crime, and the emergence of global crime
control is much more nuanced and complex in its historical, political,
and economic dimensions. For example, the rise of "transnational
organized crime" as a major point on the international policymaking
agenda in the 1990s has been attributed to the end of the Cold War
and U.S. efforts to exert its international hegemonic influence in areas
of domestic concern. 14 It has also been persuasively argued that
contemporary global crime control is a continuation of historical
trends evident in international efforts to combat piracy and
privateering in the eighteenth century and slavery in the nineteenth
century,1 5 as well as a manifestation of "ambitious efforts by
generations of Western powers to export their domestically derived
definitions of crime. 16
This Article will elucidate some of this complexity by exploring
the connections between globalization, criminal activity, and
international crime control through the prism of political economy.
Using this perspective we present a theory that sheds new light on the
dynamics of transnational crime and global crime control. In essence,
we aim to answer three consecutive questions.
First, why does crime travel across national borders? Our
initial argument is that much like other forms of economic activity,
criminal activity travels across the globe to the places in which
conducting it is most profitable for criminals. 17 We do not argue that
all forms of crime will shift across international borders in this
fashion. Rather, crimes that are driven by market-based profit move
in reaction to cost-imposing domestic regulation that makes crime less
lucrative. 18
13. PETER ANDREAS & MARTIN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND
CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, at v (2006).

14.

See Michael Woodiwiss, Transnational Organised Crime: The Global Reach of an

American Concept, in TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL SECURITY

13, 13-27 (Adam Edwards & Peter Gill eds., 2003) (arguing that the United States has
successfully exported its analysis of organized crime problems despite evidence of its
inadequacy).
15. ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 13, at 22.
16. Id. at vii.
17. The analogy between criminal and legal economic activity has its caveats (e.g., the use
of violence against competitors is more common in the former), but, in general, "illegal markets
are governed by the normal economic forces." See Pino Arlacchi, The Dynamics of Illegal Markets,
in

COMBATING

TRANSNATIONAL

CRIME: CONCEPTS, ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSES

7,

7 (Phil

Williams & Dimitri Vlassis eds., 2001) (defining illegal markets and their nature in comparison
with legal markets).
18. This conforms to some extent to the strong, though non-exclusive, association of
transnational crime with profit-based organized crime, although the theory presented in this
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Second, how do governments react to the international mobility
of criminal activity? In response to this question, we distinguish
between two types of transnational crimes, focusing on different
national approaches to the same activity. The first type consists of
crimes that local jurisdictions consider beneficial: "desirable" crimes.
These are crimes whose production processes generate economic
benefits, leading some national governments to adopt lenient crime
control policies to attract them to their territory-thus "insourcing"
crime. These crimes are generally those for which the costs of crime
"consumption" are severable from the benefits of crime "production."
For instance, money laundering often carries economic benefits in one
jurisdiction but promotes harmful crimes in other jurisdictions.
The second type consists of crimes that national jurisdictions
perceive as harmful: "undesirable" crimes. These are crimes that carry
a net cost for the state. With respect to these crimes, jurisdictions
adopt harsher sanctions at the domestic level to shift and displace
crime to other jurisdictions-thus "outsourcing" crime. For example,
many jurisdictions raise expected sanctions for drug crimes to force
drug dealers to shift their harmful activity to neighboring
jurisdictions. 19
What emerges when analyzing transnational crime and crime
control is a complex pattern of criminal regulatory competition. Over
time, various jurisdictions' tendencies towards either lenient
regulation or harsh regulation, in tandem, trigger a dynamic crime
control race. Some jurisdictions escalate their sanctions towards
undesirable crimes in a type of "arms race" to become less attractive
crime targets. Alternatively, some jurisdictions lower the criminal
sanctions for other desirable criminal activities to attract them and
reap their economic and social benefits.

Article does not rest on such an association. The CATOC, for example, criminalizes agreements
among people aimed at committing serious crimes "relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining
of a financial or other material benefit." CATOC, supra note 6, at art. 5(1)(a)(i). Also, we should
note that costs are not the only determinant of crime location; clearly, the potential for gain is
also important. Profit-driven criminal activity will only occur where it can profit. When asked
why he robbed banks, the famous 1930s bank robber "Slick" Willie Sutton replied, "Because
that's where the money is." Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI History, Famous Cases: Willie
Sutton, http://www.fbi.govflibref/historic/famcases/sutton/sutton.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009);
see also WILLIE SUTTON & EDWARD LINN, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1976).
19. To be sure, the terms outsourcing and insourcing do not describe the phenomena we
deal with perfectly because usually "outsourcing" refers to shifting production activity while
consumption activity remains static. In our context, the displacement of crime will in some cases
shift both the production and the consumption activities. Nonetheless, we choose to use these
terms in order to emphasize the connection between our framework and the vast literature
dealing with the mobility of legal economic activities.
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Finally, we ask, how should global crime control be designed to
enhance global welfare? We argue that different crime control regimes
and strategies are required depending on the type of cooperation
problem a particular transnational crime poses. The required
approach hinges mainly on the extent to which states engage in
outsourcing or insourcing of crime. Thus, while some situations call for
setting global minimum criminal standards, other situations require
setting maximum standards or more sophisticated models of
international cooperation.
To develop our theory we draw on several bodies of literature
that, in our view, have yet to be combined in a comprehensive manner
to address international crime control. 20 The first is crime
displacement literature. 2 1 This literature demonstrates that profitdriven criminals tend to shift their activity to the geographic location
in which the expected criminal payoff is maximized. Thus, if the
expected sanction in one jurisdiction rises, 22 some crime from that
jurisdiction will shift to areas in which the sanction is lower.
The second body of literature we draw from is public choice
literature. 23 This literature uses economic models to predict and
explain decisions made by political agents as aimed at promoting a
given set of preferences. We will use public choice literature's
discussion of the political economy of decentralized governments and
its analysis of criminal law. As for decentralized governments, ever

20. For an analysis of related questions in the realm of domestic law, see Doron Teichman,
The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and JurisdictionalCompetition,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1831 (2005). For a discussion of the theory and further refinements, see
Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2006);
Samuel R. Gross, Jurisdictional Competition in Criminal Justice: How Much Does it Really
Happen?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1725 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive
Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1733 (2006); Doron Teichman, Decentralizing Crime Control:
The PoliticalEconomy Perspective, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1749 (2006).
21. For early contributions to this literature, see Thomas A. Reppetto, Crime Prevention
and the Displacement Phenomenon, 22 CRIME & DELINQ. 166 (1976); Simon Hakim et al.,
InterjurisdictionalSpillover of Crime and Police Expenditures, 55 LAND ECON. 200 (1979). For
later reviews of the topic, see CRIME DISPLACEMENT (Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994); CRIME
SPILLOVER (Simon Hakim & George F. Rengert eds., 1981); RATIONAL CHOICE AND SITUATIONAL
CRIME PREVENTION (Grame Newman, Ronald V. Clarke & S. Giora Shoham eds., 1997).
22. Note that following traditional models of deterrence and crime control, a rise in the
expected sanction can be achieved either by raising the sanction attached to a crime, or by
raising the probability of detection. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207 (1968) (describing this model and using economics to find
optimal policies for combating crime).
23. For a non-technical introduction to public choice theory, see ROBERT D. COOTER, THE
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000). For a recent comprehensive discussion on the relation between
public choice theory and the law, see Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the
Regulatory State, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002).
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since Tiebout's seminal paper on the subject, 24 legal scholars have
modeled the effects of decentralization and jurisdictional competition
on an array of legal topics. 25 The general theme of these studies is that
local jurisdictions aiming to maximize their own welfare compete
among themselves in the legislative process to attract desirable
activities and repel undesirable activities. Regarding criminal law,
this emerging line of legal scholarship has explored how different
political forces involved in criminal law affect the way in which it is
26
structured.
The third body of scholarship we turn to is International
Relations ("IR") theory on international cooperation. 27 Institutionalist
or neoliberal IR theories use rational choice methods to explain and
model the emergence of different international cooperative regimes
under the prevailing condition of anarchy-that is, the absence of
centralized authority in international law and politics. These theories
build on the rationality of states and add layers of strategic thinking
to state behavior through the use of game theory. 28 This literature and
other streams of IR theory assist us both in explaining the existing
24. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
25. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (corporate law); Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriage,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995) (family law); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 458-61
(1996) (taxation); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND.
L. REV. 231 (2001) (bankruptcy law); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1210 (1992) (environmental regulation); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust
Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (trust law).
26. For some examples of this literature, see Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O'Neill,
Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline
Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973 (2006); Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 527 (1996); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.L.
REV. 505 (2001); Teichman, supra note 20.
27. For primers on the use of IR theories in the study of international law, see Kenneth W.
Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al.,
International Law and International Relations: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary
Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998).
28. See, e.g., COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth Oye ed., 1986) (reviewing game
theory and applying it to security and economic affairs); James Morrow, Modeling the Forms of
InternationalCooperation:Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387 (1994) (modeling
coordination under uncertainty and evaluating forms of coordination); Duncan Snidal,
Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation, 79 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 923 (1985) ("relaxing traditional prisoners' dilemma assumptions and developing
an alternate model of the coordination game").
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patterns of cooperation we observe and in evaluating the policy
recommendations we put forward.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II sets out our positive
theory of the political economy of global crime control, building on the
economic analysis of crime displacement and on the public choice
analysis of international regulatory competition. Part III relies on this
positive theory and explores its normative implications. We deal with
an array of legal mechanisms that states have adopted both
unilaterally and in cooperation with other states, and we present their
advantages and disadvantages in terms of efficiency and global
welfare. In addition, we explore innovative legal regimes that could
assist states in reaching more efficient crime control policies. Part IV
concludes.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE TRANSNATIONAL MOBILITY OF PROFITDRIVEN CRIME

In this Section we present a positive theory of the political
economy of transnational crime and its movement across national
borders in response to local crime control policies. We begin by
describing the way technology and economic liberalization have
internationalized the production and distribution patterns of
legitimate goods and services. Economic and regulatory differentials
between jurisdictions have permitted lawful economic activity to
travel to the locations in which it incurs lower costs and generates
higher profits. With this background, we turn to the core of our thesis
and argue that profit-driven criminal activity behaves similarly to
legal economic activity by shifting, whenever possible, to the areas
across the globe in which it is most profitable for criminals. Since
crime control policies constitute some of the major costs of conducting
criminal activity, crime is expected (other things being equal) to travel
across the globe to areas in which the cost of commission is relatively
low. Thus, crime control policies adopted by states influence the global
distribution of criminal activity and consequently affect the level of
crime and domestic policy responses thereto in other states.
A. Globalization and Shifts in Legitimate Economic Activity
One of the most salient characteristics of globalization and the
growth in international trade is the shifting of economic activity to
locations around the globe in which it can be conducted most
efficiently. In gross terms, over the last few decades significant
segments of manufacturing have shifted from developed states to the

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
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developing world. 29 Geographical transfers of economic activity have
also occurred within the industrialized world itself, as evidenced by
the decrease in the U.S. share in global output, the uneven growth of
European economies, and the rise of Japan as an economic power.3 0 As
the size of the global economy grows, production associated with a
certain place gradually shifts to more efficient locales. Those original
activities are replaced with more sophisticated and profitable ones.
For example, the textiles industry with its various stages-fiber
production, yarn preparation, fabric manufacture, cutting, sewing,
and distribution-has proven especially mobile, with its economic
locus continuously shifting from Europe to the Americas to Asia and
31
Africa.
These geographical movements of business activity result from
systemic changes that allow Smith's "invisible hand"32 and Ricardo's
principle of comparative advantage 33 to act on the international plane.
The combination of advanced technology, labor-cost differentials, trade
liberalization, and cross-border investment protection has led to
increasingly complex transnational patterns of production. Today, the
simplest of consumer products is likely the outcome of productive
34
economic processes that take place on a number of continents.
Dialing a customer-service telephone number in North America may
connect the consumer to a call center in India, where many other
service activities, such as software development, have also shifted over
the last decade. 35 As the last example demonstrates, economic shifting

29.

See PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: TRANSFORMING THE WORLD ECONOMY 27 (1998).

30.

Id. at 28-29.

31.
32.

Id. at 283-315.
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS, bk. IV.ii, at 456 (1776):
[B]y directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.... By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually
than when he really intends to promote it.
33.

See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION ch. 7

(1817) (explaining the concept of comparative advantage using wine and cloth made in Portugal
and England).
34. For an engaging account of transnational production and distribution chains, see
PIETRA RIVOLI, THE TRAVELS OF A T-SHIRT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005) (analyzing the interrelated cotton, textile, retail, and second-hand clothing sectors that span the globe).
35. See PAUL DAVIES, WHAT'S THIS INDIA BUSINESS? OFFSHORING, OUTSOURCING AND THE
GLOBAL SERVICES REVOLUTION

(2004); Srilata Zaheer & Radhika Rajan, Creativity Under

Constraint:Technological Imprintingand the Migration of Indian Business to the New Economy,
in THE GLOBAL INTERNET ECONOMY 191, 192-93 (Bruce Kogut ed., 2003) (discussing the
"evolution" of the Indian economy and factors that "influence the migration of Indian businesses
to the new economy").
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is not restricted to the manufacturing sectors but is also widely
evident in service sectors, whose importance in the global economy has
grown tremendously. Many services-such as telecommunications,
financial
services,
and entertainment,
among
others 36-are
particularly prone to economic expansion due to the increase in service
input mobility 37 and other transnational impacts of technological
38
changes.
In a world considerably flattened by technological advances
and international economic liberalization, 39 the global distribution of
economic activity is affected most fundamentally by objective economic
differences between locations, roughly tracing the range of relevant
"factor endowments" such as labor, land, and capital that determine
local comparative advantages. 40 Where physical trade is concerned (in
goods or in services requiring proximity), geographical distances to
markets that raise transportation costs may also figure highly into
decisions on production and supply locations. At times, these
transportation costs are more important than the costs of production
itself.4' However, no less important are legal and regulatory
differences between jurisdictions that make or break the international
economic viability of an enterprise in its location of choice.

36. The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") covers twelve general
service sectors: Business, Communication, Construction and Engineering, Distribution,
Education, Environment, Financial, Health, Tourism and Travel, Recreation, Culture and
Sporting, Transport, and the catch-all Other, that are further divided into sub-sectors. Final Act,
supra note 2, at 1168. For an introduction to the GATS, see WTO, A HANDBOOK ON THE GATS
AGREEMENT (2005).
37. On the importance of input mobility in the growth of international trade, see RONALD
W. JONES, GLOBALIZATION AND THE THEORY OF INPUT TRADE (2000).
38. Technological advances have been key in increasing international trade in services,
perhaps even more than legal deregulation. For a prescient analysis of the potential geographical
effects of technological change in international services provision, see D.G. PRICE & A.M. BLAIR,
THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF THE SERVICE SECTOR chs. 6, 8 (1989).
39. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2005) (a popular and influential depiction of the technological and economic changes
of globalization).
40. We allude to the Heckscher-Ohlin "factor-proportions hypothesis," whereby states will
tend to export products that use factors of production in which they are abundant, and import
products that use factors in which they are poor. For the original formulations of the HeckscherOhlin theorem from 1919 and 1924, see ELI F. HECKSCHER & BERTIL ORLIN, HECKSCHER-OHLIN
TRADE THEORY (Harry Flam & M. June Flanders eds., trans., 1991).
41. The literature on location and transportation costs is vast and highly sector-specific. For
basic generalized discussions, see Maurice Fulton & L. Clinton Hoch, TransportationFactors
Affecting Locational Decisions, 35 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 51 (1959) (discussing transportation and
economic theory); Aneel Karnani, The Trade-Off Between Production and TransportationCosts
in Determining Optimal Plant Size, 4 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 45 (1983) (presenting a model for
analyzing the trade-off between a large plant that enhances economies of scale and a small plant
that decreases transportation costs).
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Perhaps the most obvious regulatory factor is taxation.
Corporate, capital, sales, and income tax rates and policies among
different locations may vary considerably and impact business plans
regarding international investment, incorporation, and physical
location of production or supply. Such differences have resulted in
vigorous international tax competition. 42 States compete to provide the
lowest tax rate to attract multi-million dollar manufacturing and
assembly plants that may significantly affect economic growth and the
livelihood of thousands of workers. A famous example is the role of low
taxes in the reinvention of the Republic of Ireland as the "Celtic
Tiger," attracting strategic investments from corporations such as
Intel, Bell Labs, and Dell. 43 Other regulatory factors include but are
not limited to bureaucracy; labor; environmental, health, and safety
regulations; consumer protection rules; and subsidies.
Shifting production and distribution has been encouraged by
transnational corporate conglomeration in the business sector.
Multinational corporations ("MNCs") have emerged as major economic
players with both the incentives and resources needed to take optimal
advantage of economic and regulatory differences between
jurisdictions and to channel each part of their activities to the most
efficient location through geographically sensitive trade and
investment. 44 This entails globalizing at all levels of business activity
-research and development, manufacturing, product development,
quality control, financing, purchasing and procurement, inventory
management, marketing and advertising, distribution, sales and
45
service, administration, and more.

42. See INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY (James R. Hines, Jr., ed.,
2001) (analyzing the effect of tax policies on the activities of multinational firms); Reuven S. AviYonah, Bridging the North/South Divide: InternationalRedistribution and Tax Competition, 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 371 (2004) (explaining the distributive effects of tax competition in the context
of international development).
43.

See PAUL SWEENEY, THE CELTIC TIGER: IRELAND'S CONTINUING ECONOMIC MIRACLE

(2000) (providing various explanations for Irish growth with a focus on tax policy and surveying
the effects of tax-induced investment on production and trade); Sean Dorgan, How Ireland
Became the Celtic Tiger (The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1945, 2006), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/bg1945.cfm (discussing Ireland's economic
revival).
44. See Brian Roach, A Primer on Multinational Corporations, in LEVIATHANS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW GLOBAL HISTORY 19 (Alfred D. Chandler & Bruce
Mazlish eds., 2005) (reviewing the growth of multinational corporations and explanations for
their success).
45. See MICHAEL J. MARQUARDT, THE GLOBAL ADVANTAGE: HOW WORLD-CLASS
ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE PERFORMANCE THROUGH GLOBALIZATION (1999) (providing a business

literature perspective on the globalization of business operations by Multinational Corporations).
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Of course, these are not the only factors that contribute to the
international locational shifting in the production of legitimate goods
and services, but they are important ones. What is significant is that
regulatory differences between jurisdictions are a major consideration
in business decisions relating to location of business activities such as
production and supply. At this point we turn to explore the analogous
effects of globalization on the locational aspects of transnational
criminal activity.
B. Globalizationand Decentralized Crime Control
The economic model of crime control treats potential criminals
as rational individuals who choose to participate in criminal activity to
promote their personal well-being. 46 According to this model, criminals
weigh the costs and benefits associated with criminal activity and
choose to commit a crime if, and only if, its benefits outweigh its costs.
Our focus in this study is not on the decision criminals make as to
whether to commit a crime. Rather, we focus on the decision they must
make as to where to commit a crime. Just as T-shirt producers decide
what location will maximize the value of production, certain criminals
figure out which location will maximize their criminal profits. As in
legal markets, the profitability of crime differs between states due to
an array of factors, including the distance to consumer markets and
the technological infrastructure of the state.
Additional factors that affect the profits of crime are legal
costs. The expected sanction (composed of the probability of detection
and the actual sanction inflicted) is a cost criminals must consider
when deciding where to commit their crimes. Indeed, "the cost of doing
business within the illegal economy is much higher than in the legal
economy" 4 7 because of the additional cost of minimizing exposure to
sanctions. This suggests that differences in expected sanctions may
weigh heavily in the determination of the locus of criminal
enterprises. When crime control is governed by a decentralized
political structure, as in the international arena, sanction arbitrages
may emerge. In such situations, if everything else is equal, criminal

46. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 22, at 176-79 (analyzing the supply of crime); Isaac
Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 44 (1996)
(identifying, as one of the key assumptions underlying the economic model of crime, that
criminals "behave in accordance with the rules of optimizing behavior").
47. Arlacchi supra note 17, at 8.
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activity will shift to those states in which the expected sanction is
48
lowest.
Building on this theoretical framework, economists have
modeled different aspects of the geography of criminal activity and the
precautions taken by crime victims. 4 9 Criminologists have studied how
public and private measures aimed at lowering the expected payoffs of
crime by "hardening" potential crime targets have affected the location
of criminal activity. 50 Examples of such measures include installation
of police patrols, fences, and street lighting. These studies
demonstrate that in many cases such measures result in the
displacement of crime to areas where similar measures are not used.
Concrete examples of such crime displacement exist with respect to
burglary, 51 robbery, 52 sales of illegal narcotics, 53 growing of illegal
narcotics, 54 and prostitution. 5 5
48. Significant criticism has been brought against the traditional economic model of crime
control. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 20 (expressing disagreement with the scope of Teichman's
argument that states can export crime); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law
Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (arguing that
laws do not deter criminals, in part because criminals do not know the law and/or are not capable
of acting rationally in the economic sense). In a nut shell, these criticisms view crime as a
complex social phenomenon and argue that criminals do not behave in the way economic models
predict. While this literature makes legitimate criticisms, we find it less relevant to our project
because our analysis deals mostly with transnational profit-driven crimes.
49. E.g., Joseph Deutsch, Simon Hakim & J. Weinblatt, A Micro Model of the Criminal's
Location Choice, 22 J. URB. ECON. 198 (1987) (modeling the spatial decision of criminals); Scott
Freeman, The Spatial Concentration of Crime, 40 J. URBAN ECON. 216 (1996) (modeling the
spatial concentration of crime); Koo Hui-wen & I.P.L. Png, Private Security: Deterrent or
Diversion?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (1994) (modeling crime displacement); Steven Shavell,
IndividualPrecautionsto Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 123 (1991) (evaluating the precaution decision that potential crime victims make).
50. See generally sources cited supranote 21 (surveying crime displacement literature).
51. Stephen L. Mehay, Burglary Spillover in Los Angeles, in CRIME SPILLOVER, supra note
21, at 67.
52. Chrisban Grandjean, Bank Robberies and Physical Security in Switzerland: A Case
Study of the Escalabonand Displacement Phenomena, 1 SECURITY J. 155 (1990). But see Anthony
A. Braga et al., Problem Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled
Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 567-69 (1999) (reporting that "[r]obbery calls.., were not
displaced").
53. Rick Curtis & Michele Sviridoff, The Social Organization of Street-Level Drug Markets
and Its Impact on the Displacement Effect, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT, supra note 21, at 155
(studying the displacement of drug dealers in Brooklyn); John E. Eck, The Threat of Crime
Displacement, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT, supra note 21, at 103, 111-12 (Robert P. McNamara ed.,
1994) (reviewing the literature on displacement and drug enforcement). But see Braga et al.,
supra note 52, at 567 (reporting that "drug offense calls and arrests ... were not displaced").
54. John R. Fuller & James R. O'Malley, Enforcement and Displacement: The Case of
Marijuana Growing, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT, supra note 21, at 137.

55. Phil Hubbard, Community Action and the Displacement of Street Prostitution:Evidence
from British Cities, 29 GEOFORUM 269 (1998); J. Lowman, Prostitutionin Vancouver: Some Notes
on the Genesis of a Social Problem, 28 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986); Roger Mathews,
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One example of sanction arbitrages that bring about intrastate
crime displacement can be seen in the U.S. criminal system. In the
U.S. federal system, the constituent states control most criminal
regulation. This decentralized power provides a ripe environment for
local initiatives that cause crime to travel across state lines. For
example, some states' "three strikes" laws have caused criminals who
already have two convictions to shift their activity to non-three strikes
states, because the sanction faced in those states is significantly lower
than those faced in the three strikes states. 56 Within states with
centralized criminal systems, local jurisdictions cannot control the
severity of criminal sanctions because the central government holds
the exclusive power to legislate criminal law. Nonetheless, even in
centralized settings local government initiatives can cause crime
displacement. In Israel, for instance, some municipalities use private
security companies to deal with local crime problems. These
initiatives, in turn, cause criminals to shift their activity to
57
municipalities that do not employ such measures.
Several qualifications must be made to the displacement
hypothesis set forth above. First, in the realm of domestic law,
criminals are literally displaced from one area to another;
displacement in the international context probably will not produce
the same result. In the domestic context, as the cost of committing
crimes in one jurisdiction rises, criminals leave that jurisdiction and
move to other jurisdictions in which the cost is lower. 58 While
displacement of criminals themselves cannot be ruled out in the
international context, a much more plausible result is displacement of
the criminal activities. In other words, lowering the cost of crime in
one part of the globe will probably not attract the physical relocation
of foreign criminals, but instead it will provide local criminals a
competitive advantage with respect to committing crime. As a result of
that advantage, more local residents will engage in criminal activity,
thereby lowering the number of people in other jurisdictions engaged
in the same crime. 59 Just as the people engaged in T-shirt production
Developing More Effective Strategies for Curbing Prostitution,1 SECURITY J. 182 (1990); Robert
P. McNamara, Crime Displacement and Male Prostitution in Times Square, in CRIME
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 21, at 121.
56. Teichman, supranote 20, at 1847-48.
57. Doron Teichman, The Geography of Crime: Jurisdictional Competition and Crime
Control Policies, MISHPATIM (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review).
58. See Teichman, supra note 20, at 1843-47 (describing how auto thieves migrated
between states).
59. In the regulatory competition literature this phenomenon is known as "market share
competition." See DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION 7 (2004).
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do not travel from one state to another as a result of changing costs,
the producers of illegal narcotics are not expected to travel.
Second, shifting criminal activity from one place to another is a
costly endeavor that is expected to create rigidity in the crime market
and prevent some criminal activity from moving to more profitable
areas. Costs such as setting up production lines, establishing contacts
with local enforcement officials, and developing contacts with other
criminals in the region are all state specific and must be treated as
sunk costs for criminals. 60 In addition, ethnic and language differences
might cause difficulties for crime displacement. For instance, if a
certain narcotic is distributed in the United States by members of
criminal groups that migrated from its traditional place of
production,6 1 then shifting production to other parts of the globe that
have different ethnic composition and hence cannot build on preexisting social networks might be difficult. 62 Thus, some criminal
activity might remain in regions despite the costs of crime in those
regions rising over time.
Finally, we would like to emphasize the scope of our claims in
this Article. Our theory deals mainly with profit-driven criminal
activity that tends to behave in a rational manner: crimes such as
money laundering, drug trafficking, and gambling. Clearly, many
(perhaps even most) crimes do not fit this characterization and are
committed on a local and spontaneous basis, notwithstanding the
potential for sanction arbitrage by commission in other areas. For
instance, crimes driven by emotions such as intramarital crimes are
probably not susceptible to geographic substitution. 63
C. The PoliticalEconomy of InternationalCrime Control
Our theory is built from the bottom up. In other words, we
describe the incentives of decisionmakers on a national level, and from
that we draw a global picture of crime control. As we shall see in
detail below, domestic politicians and decisionmakers may have
60. For examples of barriers to displacement on the local level, see Ren6 Hesseling, Theft
from Cars: Reduced or Displaced?, 3 EURO. J. ON CRIM. POL'Y & REs. 79, 87-88 (1995) (finding
that reluctance to move to unfamiliar areas or to move away from known suppliers or customers
can prevent displacement); Reppetto, supra note 21, at 175.
61. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2178-79
(2002) (pointing out the role of ethnic ties in crime organizations).
62. One could view the argument in the text as a form of informal vertical integration that
creates barriers to entry into the market. See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983).

63. See, e.g., John P. Mclver, Criminal Mobility, in CRIME SPILLOVER, supra note 21, at 20,
36 (pointing out that crimes of passion tend not to be displaced).

2009]

OUTSOURCING AND INSOURCING CRIME

incentives either to attract crime (crime "insourcing") or to repel it
(crime "outsourcing"). The precise structure of these incentives will
depend on the nature of the activity involved and the nature of each
state's regime, economy, and society.
1. International Crime Outsourcing
We begin by describing the outsourcing of crime because it
reflects the basic intuitions of crime control. The general tendency is
to view crime as a negative social phenomenon that involves many
harms. First and foremost are direct harms such as lost lives, bodily
injuries, and destroyed property. In the United States alone, a 1988
study estimated the costs of crime to victims at $92.6 billion. 64 These
direct harms result in popular demand for crime reduction, which in
turn translates into incentives for elected politicians to adopt policies
that will reduce crime. Another harm associated with crime is its
effect on international investment. Local communities have an
incentive to attract capital that can bring about increased employment
and economic prosperity. High crime rates deter foreign investors and
impair economic growth, 65 giving states an incentive to reduce their
crime rates. For instance, President Mbeki of South Africa has
reportedly adopted an aggressive crime control program in order to
attract international investors.6 6 Finally, the types of profit-driven
crime investigated in this study often involve sophisticated criminal
organizations. As these organizations gain power and influence, they
pose threats to the stability of states' political systems. The United
Nations General Assembly has noted its concern with "the impact of
64. Mark A. Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to
Victims, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 537, 539 (1988).
65. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME & LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN REGION OF WORLD
BANK, CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: TRENDS, COSTS, AND POLICY OPTIONS IN THE

CARIBBEAN 49 (2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHAITIResources
/Crimeandviolenceinthecaribbeanfullreport.pdf (showing that a majority of firms in the
Dominican Republic cite crime as "a major obstacle to investment" and reported that their access
to financing had declined due to crime, even though only a small portion of the same firms had
been direct victims of crime); Kenyan Crime Puts Off Investment, BBC NEWS, Mar. 21, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hifbusiness/4828070.stm (reporting that rising crime rates in Kenya have
significantly reduced levels of Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") in comparison to safer
neighboring states such as Uganda and Tanzania); U.N.: Urban Crime Drives Away Investment,
USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-O1-urban-crime_- N.htm

(describing U.N. report finding a correlation between insecurity caused by crime and low
investment).
66. See Sam Kiley, Mbeki's Crime Busters, TIMES (Eng.), July 16, 1999, at 16; see also
George R.G. Clarke et al., South Africa: An Assessment of the Investment Climate 90-97 (Africa
Private Sector Group, World Bank 2005), available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/20O5/dti_
ica.pdf (demonstrating strong influences of crime rates on investment).
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transnational organized crime on the political, social and economic
stability and development of societies." 6 7 Thus, if a political
establishment wishes to maintain its independence from criminal
forces, it has an incentive to adopt policies that will combat these
threats.
The forces described above give politicians and decisionmakers
incentives to reduce local crime, even if this entails displacing crime to
other states-producing the outsourcing of crime. This goal can be
achieved by raising expected sanctions and harshening other types of
regulation that affect crime so that the state becomes a relatively less
attractive environment (or target) for criminals. In other words, when
states design their crime control policies they take into account the
policies of other states. In the dynamic setting in which these
conditions apply, many states interested in outsourcing crime will
adopt a similar national strategy towards crime, which will result in a
"race towards strictness" of ever-increasing sanctions. Thus, much like
the arms race of the Cold War, there can be an "arms race" between
states as a result of each state's war on crime.
To be sure, we do not argue that jurisdictions engage in
deliberate efforts to displace crime to other jurisdictions. A nation can
adopt a certain crime control measure for an array of political reasons
that have little to do with crime displacement. 68 Nonetheless, once one
state adopts a measure, for whatever reason, the effects of this policy
will be felt in other states, driving them to adopt similar policies. For
instance, three strikes laws were not enacted deliberately to displace
crime into other jurisdictions. 69 Yet once they were enacted,
70
displacement became a factor in their dissemination.
2. International Crime Insourcing
The dynamics of outsourcing crime are, however, only one part
of the story. We now turn to explore the political economy of
insourcing crime. While some types of criminal activity pose threats to
national political actors and decisionmakers, other crimes might
actually be seen by them as "desirable." We identify three main forces
67. G.A. Res. 56/120, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/120 (Jan. 23, 2002).
68. For an analysis of the political forces driving criminal legislation in the United States,
see Barkow, supra note 20, at 1720-23.
69. OFFICE OF THE ATT'y GEN., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, "THREE-STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT":
IT'S IMPLICATIONS ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFTER FOUR YEARS 10 (1998)

(describing the displacement caused by the local three strike law as an "unintended but positive
consequence").
70. David LaCourse, Editorial, Viewpoint: '3 Strikes, You're Out' Law Proving to Be
Efficient Crime Fighter,NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Apr. 3, 1997, at A9.
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(at times overlapping) that might turn crime into a desirable activity
from the perspective of policymakers. First, crimes (or activity that
contributes to crime) might be perceived as conferring benefits on the
general public. This might be the case when communities in different
jurisdictions differ with respect to the definition of undesirable
activity. For example, one community might view the production or
use of a certain substance (such as alcohol or marijuana) as a crime
worthy of severe punishment, while other communities see it as
legitimate behavior that is not a crime--or at least as behavior that
although formally illegal, is not to be subjected to strict sanctions
71
because it is not understood to cause social problems.
The general benefits of crime may be indirect as well, such as
when activity considered criminal in some jurisdictions is tolerated
elsewhere not because of any inherent value but simply because it
supports local employment, economic growth, and government
revenue. Legal casino gambling in places like Macao or Monte Carlo is
an example. In Macao, the local population does not see the freedom to
gamble as a value worth protecting in itself-in fact, there is
considerable local concern about its negative social effects-but at the
same time it is understood that the local economy is highly dependent
on the provision of gambling services, which are tolerated for the sake
of their indirect effects. 72 These trends explain the emergence of
criminal activity even when it is recognized internationally as illegal.
For example, narcotics farming and production, for all their negative
effects in source (and target) states, support production states'
73
economies and the livelihood of the farmers.
Second, harmful crimes might confer benefits to specific
interest groups. These interest groups may include actors from the
legitimate economy, such as the tourism sector and financial
institutions. Or, these groups may include shadier forces like
organized crime entrepreneurs. These interest groups can influence
politicians to view these crimes as desirable, or at least to turn a blind
71. For example, the liberal policy towards drug use in the Netherlands has been explained
as the outcome of a general liberal and non-paternalistic Dutch approach to law-enforcement
known as "Gedogen", whereby only social cost-imposing law violations are repressed through law
enforcement. Justus Uitermark, The Origins and Futureof the Dutch Approach Towards Drugs,
34 J. DRUG ISSUES 511 (2004).

72. See Fanny Vong Chuk Kwan, Gambling Attitudes and Gambling Behavior of Residents
of Macao: The Monte Carlo of the Orient, 42 J. TRAVEL RES. 271 (2004) (noting that fifty percent
of Macao's tax revenue in the 1990s came from gambling, and discussing the future of Macao's
economy in the face of local ambivalence towards gambling practices).
73. On the complexity of the effects of narcotics farming in source states, see Richard B.
Craig, Illicit Drug Traffic: Implications for South American Source States, 29 J. INTERAMERICAN
STUD. & WORLD AFF. 1 (1987) (analyzing these effects for Bolivia, Peru, and Columbia).
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eye to them, through legal practices like political sponsoring and
election funding, or through illegal practices like vote buying and
bribery.
Finally, crimes can directly serve the personal interests of
politicians and decisionmakers. This is the case with corrupt regimes
in which political leaders concurrently function as heads of criminal
organizations or maintain close relations with them. In such
situations, politicians pocket the profits of crime for themselves and
have an interest in insourcing its production, regardless of who bears
the costs.
The political forces that lead to the insourcing of crime suggest
a dynamic that is the mirror image of the crime outsourcing process.
Over time, a race towards leniency should be observed, in which some
states situate themselves as attractive sites in which to commit
certain crimes or crime-related acts.7 4 This race towards leniency can
be seen with respect to both regulation and enforcement mechanisms.
In extreme cases, governments might become directly involved in
international criminal activity.
3. Complex Scenarios: Concurrent Insourcing and Outsourcing
In addition to examples of pure insourcing or outsourcing races,
more complex patterns of international criminal regulatory
competition are likely to emerge. In a given area of transnationally
mobile illicit activity, some jurisdictions might consider the activity,
on balance, to be undesirable and attempt to outsource it, while other
jurisdictions may consider the activity, on balance, to be desirable and
attempt to insource it. Thus, we might see the emergence of policy
heterogeneity: a "race towards strictness" in some jurisdictions and a
simultaneous "race towards leniency" in others.
However, this does not mean that the relationship between
crime-outsourcing
states
and
crime-insourcing
states
is
complementary or symbiotic. Crime-attracting states can produce
transnational harmful effects in crime-deterring states, making the
latter's efforts at combating the undesired activity ineffective. Such
policies might even be deliberate, as states seek to capture the
benefits of a criminal activity while externalizing its costs.
Paradoxically, the combination of crime deterrence and crime
encouragement may prove so effective and mutually supportive that

74. To be more precise, this is the case with respect to crimes that serve interest groups or
the regime itself. Crimes that are not regulated only because of diverse beliefs about
wrongfulness are not expected to generate a race towards leniency.
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both sides lose. For example, the United States has pursued
aggressive deportation and repatriation policies to "export" (or rather,
to re-export) dangerous criminal gang members to their source states.
These states may have in the past generally considered gang activity
(especially in its "exported" form) desirable or tolerable. However, in
many cases these states were not prepared for the repatriation of gang
members hardened by the tough realities of U.S. inner cities. As a
result, gang activity has intensified in the source states and is no
longer considered desirable by any standard. The same gang members
use their reclaimed homelands as bases from which to conduct
advanced criminal activity in the United States. 75 Even more complex
are situations in which cross-crime effects are felt. The legality of the
sale of guns in the United States results in a flow of weapons to
Mexico; these are then used in Mexico by drug dealers who target the
76
U.S. market for illegal narcotics.
In each of these three scenarios-insourcing races, outsourcing
races, and heterogeneity-states (and the international community)
are faced with different cooperation problems. As we will discuss in
Part III, the diversity of relationships between and among crimeoutsourcing states and crime-insourcing states-as well as the optimal
form of regulating these relationships-hinges on understanding the
externalities that each type of state inflicts on the other in the global
environment.
D. Examples
In this Subsection we present a few concrete examples of crime
outsourcing and insourcing. These examples will allow us to
substantiate our theory and explore how it plays out in practice.

75.

See Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America, 84 FOREIGN AFF.,

May/June 2005, at 98, 98 ("Ultraviolent youth gangs, spawned in the ghettos of Los Angeles and
other U.S. cities, have slowly migrated south to Central America, where they have transformed
themselves into powerful, cross-border crime networks."); Robert J. Lopez, Rich Connell & Chris
Kraul, MS-13: An InternationalFranchise-GangUses Deportationto its Advantage to Flourish in
U.S., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at 1 (reporting that "a deportation policy aimed in part at
breaking up a Los Angeles street gang has backfired and helped spread it across Central
America and back into other parts of the United States," including Washington, D.C., and New
York).
76. Louis E.V. Nevaer, American Guns Help Fuel Mexico's Drug Trade Killings, S.F.
CHRON., July 15, 2007, at D4.
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1. Drugs
An obvious first example is drug production and trafficking.
Actors in the international market for illicit drugs function much like
for-profit corporations, aiming to maximize their revenues and
minimize their costs. 77 Interestingly, we can observe that some states
attempt to insource these crimes while others attempt to outsource
them.
Insourcing states do so for a variety of reasons. One major
reason is that the ruling political elite in those states often reap the
benefits of the crime. One such example is North Korea, whose central
government is reportedly actively engaged in the production and
exportation of illicit drugs. 78 A second example is Guinea Bissau,
where cooperation between the local military and South American
drug cartels has created an ideal transit point for drugs into
Europe 9-demonstrating that every link in the criminal production
chain can be displaced and is therefore subject to regulatory
competition. Another prominent example of a drug production
insourcing state is Afghanistan, which has experienced an opium
boom since the 1990s due to a confluence of factors.80 Under
international pressure, traditional opium-producing states such as
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey gradually managed to eradicate their
opium-farming industries, leaving global demand unsatisfied. During
the same period, central governance collapsed in Afghanistan due to
the 1979 Soviet invasion and its aftermath. This presented a
tremendous economic opportunity for Afghanistan's impoverished
farmers: "[Iln many ways [opium] is a miracle crop for Afghanistan's
battered rural economy-a durable commodity commanding a high
77. The size of the worldwide retail-level market for illicit drugs in 2003 was estimated at
$321.6 billion. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2005 WORLD DRUG REPORT 17 (2005), available
at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysisWDR-2005.html. The latest U.N. report
does not include an updated figure of this estimate. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2007
WORLD DRUG REPORT (2007) [hereinafter 2007 U.N. DRUG REPORT], available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2007.html.
78. Bill Powell, The Tony Soprano of North Korea, TIME, July 12, 2007, http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1642898,00.html.
http://www
2007,
June
27,
Country, TIME,
Walt,
Cocaine
79. Vivienne
.time.comltime/magazine/article/0,9171,1637719,00.html. Similarly, it has been reported that
Guatemala has become a haven for drug dealers due to the corruption of local law enforcement.
Jerry Seper, U.S. Agents See Drug Flow via Guatemalaon Increase, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003,
at A8.
80. See Christopher Ward & William Byrd, Afghanistan's Opium Drug Economy (World
Bank, South Asia Poverty Reduction Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www00 9 00
6
-2 50
/000012
wds.worldbank.org/external/defaultWDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/01/0
(analyzing
the
106091108/Rendered/PDF/311490PAPEROAF100SASPROnoO51DecO17 1.pdf
opium boom in Afghanistan and its effects on Afghanistan's economy).
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price, with a guaranteed market outlet, easy to transport, and nonperishable."8 1 Thus, the lack of law enforcement allowed global market
forces to work, turning the illicit production of opium into a "desirable"
crime in Afghanistan. Furthermore, opium production was sheltered
by governmental protection when Afghan warlords became involved in
production and trafficking, reportedly giving allegiance to the Taliban
82
"in return for a promise to keep the opium profit."
States that wish to fight the drug trade, on the other hand, find
themselves not only in a battle with drug traders, but also in criminal
regulatory competition with other states regarding the toughness of
their drug laws. Tough drug laws in other states drive international
drug activity in their direction, prompting a "race towards strictness,"
or outsourcing race. For example, Canada borders the United States,
which is known as one of the toughest states in the world with respect
to drug crimes. Law enforcement agents in Canada have demanded
larger budgets and higher sanctions in order to effectively fight drug
activity coming from the United States. Because of Canada's relatively
low sentences for drug crimes, one Canadian drug enforcement official
was quoted as saying, "Organized crime groups laugh at us in Canada.
8 3
We are an easy mark."
Similarly, the United States has managed to displace a
significant part of the production of the synthetic drug
methamphetamine ("meth") to Mexico 8 4 by adopting a regulatory
scheme that has made it more difficult to buy the chemicals from
which the drug is produced.8 5 Interestingly, U.S. legislators were
aware of the possibility that the regulations would merely shift meth
production to Mexico and leave local consumption unchanged-a
classic case of outsourcing production, even if the unwanted costs of
consumption remain.8 6 Nonetheless, given the dangers meth
production presents for law enforcement agents and the surrounding
communities, the legislators were content with displacing production
only. As Senator Talent, who cosponsored the bill, stated: "Even if it
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id.
83. Andrew Mitrovica, Low Funding Caused U.S. Drug Action, B.C. Says Blacklist
Considered, Ruled Out for Now, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Aug. 16, 1999, at Al; see also Shannon
McCaffrey, Potent Marijuana Rolls into U.S. from Canada: A Joint Antismuggling Effort is
Hindered by Liberal Laws in Canada,PHILA. INQUIRER, June 23, 2003, at Al (noting that U.S.
law enforcement agents cite the lower sanctions for drug crimes in Canada as a "problem").
84.

2007 U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 77, at 123.

85. See 21 U.S.C. § 830 (2006) (creating an array of limitations on the sale of
pseudoephedrine, the active ingredient in Meth).
86. See Sam Hananel, Congress Moves Closer to Passing Anti-Meth Law, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 16, 2006.
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doesn't reduce the number of meth addicts by even one, stopping the
labs is a huge plus." 87 Following these developments, Mexico has
reportedly adopted similar measures, thus displacing some of its
meth-related activity to Central America and even Africa.88
2. Gambling
Gambling is another telling example of illicit activity shifting
from one national jurisdiction to another, being both outsourced and
insourced in response to differential domestic regulation. Gambling
presents an interesting case for a number of reasons. First, in
economic terms, gambling services are relatively unfettered by the
objective criteria that generally establish competitive advantages,
such as climate, land, labor, or skills. Absent regulatory intervention,
gambling services can be provided or consumed virtually anywhere.
Therefore, geographical movements of gambling activity can be
9
attributed largely to regulatory differences between jurisdictions.8
This is evident not only on the interstate level but transnationally as
well. For example, since the early 1990s the government of Ontario,
Canada, has invested heavily in the legal casino it owns in Windsor,
Ontario-just across the river from Detroit, Michigan. 90 This
development-reportedly causing Michigan a capital loss of almost $1
million per day in 1994 9 1-prompted Michigan voters to approve
various proposals legalizing casinos throughout the state, overcoming
92
previous objections to gaming operations.

87. Id.
88. 2007 U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 77, at 123. There are examples of such phenomena
taking place with respect to trafficking as well. For example, in 1999 Mexican officials proudly
indicated that they had managed to displace cocaine routes to other states with their law
enforcement efforts. John Ward Anderson & Douglas Farah, Mexico Faces U.S. Scorn in Failing
Drug War, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A15.
89. In the United States, for example, casino gaming, which was originally pursued in only
a few locales, has considerably expanded in geographic terms over the last few decades due to
economic competition. The number of states licensing casinos increased from only one in the
1970s to twenty-seven states in 1999. William R. Eadington, The Economics of Casino Gambling,
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 173 (1999).

90. In 2005, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced that the
government was going to invest $400 million in Casino Windsor. News Release, Ontario Ministry
of Econ. Dev. & Trade, Government of Ontario Invests in a Competitive Casino Windsor (Feb. 14,
2005), http://www.ontariocanada.com/ontcanpage.do?page=5900.
91. As Vote Nears, Detroit Edges Closer to Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, at 28.
92. William M. Thompson & R. Fred Wacker, The Michigan Question: A Legal Quandary, 1
GAMING L. REV. 501, 501 (1997).
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Second, the immorality of gambling is relative and evidently
pliable 93 to the point that gaming lends itself easily to a spectrum of
incremental degrees of criminalization. This spectrum ranges from
absolute bans, to discreet regulation or guarded tolerance, to
government monopolization, and even to full liberalization. This
allows governments to be relatively flexible in setting the desired level
of formal gambling activity in their territories, either discouraging or
encouraging it as the case may be.
Third, while gambling operations in the past would rely on the
physical mobility of patrons and their relative geographical proximity
(e.g., Monte Carlo in Western Europe, 94 Las Vegas in the western
United States, Atlantic City in the eastern United States, 95 and Macao
in East Asia 96), contemporary gaming services have proven
particularly adaptive to Internet technology. Much of the modern
gambling economy is online, permitting remote transboundary
provision of gaming services, with gamblers virtually indifferent to the
physical location of providers. 97 Moreover, this has complicated the
ability of national authorities to regulate gambling independently
98
within their jurisdictions, creating a distinctly international issue.
Fourth, the relative criminalization of gambling is often
considered in cost-benefit terms, taking into account government
profits, tax revenues, increased employment, and peripheral gains
93. Allegedly, even evangelist Reverend Billy Graham found Las Vegas to be "a nice place
to visit," pointing out that "while he did not gamble himself, the Bible said nothing definitive
against the practice." JOHN M. FINDLAY, PEOPLE OF CHANCE: GAMBLING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
FROM JAMESTOWN TO LAS VEGAS 203 (1986).

94. The economic affluence and continued political independence of the principality of
Monaco have, to a large extent, been based on the legendary success of Monte Carlo's luxury
casino in the nineteenth century-a direct result of regulatory lenience aimed at insourcing
activity that was considered illegal elsewhere. The Principality's income from gambling
permitted it to engage in another form of regulatory competition when it abolished all individual
taxes in 1869, creating a tax haven that has drawn millionaires from all over the world to shift
their domicile to Monaco. Russell T. Barnhart, The Legal Future of Monte Carlo, the World's
Oldest Gambling Casino, 1 GAMING L. REV. 371 (1997).
95. Legalized casino gambling was introduced in Atlantic City, N.J., in 1976, in an effort to
revitalize the East Coast resort. This is another example of a jurisdiction's attempt to
decriminalize a certain activity for economic gains. However, interfering planning and political
factors severely impeded the anticipated success of this move. Paul Teske & Bela Sur, Winners
and Losers: Politics, Casino Gambling,and Development in Atlantic City, 10 REV. POL. RES. 130,
135 (1991).

96. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
97. See I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS, JR., INTERNET GAMING LAW 53 (2005)
(discussing the proliferation of gambling in light of technological change).
98. See I. Nelson Rose, Should Antigua Sue China?, 11 GAMING L. REV. 645, 645 (2007)
(noting that "[glambling has almost always been a local issue .... The introduction of internet
gaming into interstate and intercommercial commerce has turned the control of gambling on its
head.").
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(such as income from tourism) on the one hand, and moral
considerations as well as social and incidental costs associated with
gambling (such as violence and prostitution) on the other hand. 99
Thus, it is particularly interesting to focus on the dynamics of
the contemporary online gambling industry and the transnational
insourcing and outsourcing trends that it has produced over the last
few years. At the advent of online gambling in the 1990s, because
remote gaming was generally outlawed in the United States, 10 0
Internet firms targeting the U.S. market for gaming sought to
establish their operations-in both corporate and operational termsoutside the United States to avoid criminal liability and its costs. U.S.
laws thus resulted in crime outsourcing, with production of the
criminal activity shifting abroad and consumption remaining at home.
Concurrently, in a classic case of crime insourcing, a number of nonU.S. jurisdictions rose to the challenge and provided attractive
taxation and regulatory packages to investors in gaming enterprises,
facilitating the establishment and licensing of Internet gambling
providers. This phenomenon continues today, with many jurisdictions
competing over the insourcing of Internet gaming providers. 10 1
There is an acute tension between the United States as a
gaming outsourcing jurisdiction and other states as gaming insourcing
jurisdictions.1 0 2 Indeed, to the extent that Internet technology enables
a state to reap the economic benefits of gaming while minimizing its
costs, there is a strong incentive to insource gambling services for
export purposes. At the same time, "a country that 'exports' gambling
99.

For a comprehensive study of gambling regulation in the United States, covering many

of the points mentioned here, see EDWARD A. MORSE & ERNEST P. GOSs, GOVERNING FORTUNE:
CASINO GAMBLING IN AMERICA (2007).

100. See Joel Michael Schwarz, The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1021, 1028-38 (1999) (arguing forcefully that internet gambling is illegal in the
United States, even if servers are based offshore); see also Gregory Manter, The Pending
Determinationof the Legality of Internet Gambling in the United States, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV.
16,
16-22,
available
at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/
2003DLTR0016.pdf (discussing legality of internet gambling in the United States with respect to
judicial and legislative subsequent developments).
101. Such jurisdictions include, but are not limited to, the United Kingdom, Canada, Costa
Rica, Gibraltar, Antigua and Barbuda, and recently, the seemingly unlikely state of Papua New
Guinea. See Edward A. Morse, The Internet Gambling Conundrum: ExtraterritorialImpacts of
Domestic Regulation, 23 COMP. L. & SEC. REPORT 529, 530 (2007). For an example of undisguised
publicity aimed at attracting internet gambling businesses to (in this case) the Isle of Man, see
Casino Blog, Isle of Man: Nice Place for Your Online Gambling
Business!,
http://casinoblog.viaden.com/2007/03/15/isle-of-man-nice-place-for-your-online-gamblingbusiness/ (Apr. 16, 2007, 18:26 EST) (publishing an interview with Tim Craine, e-business
minister of the Isle of Man, who explains tax and other benefits).
102. This is an example of heterogeneity, a complex model of inter-jurisdictional competition,
as explained supra Part II.C.3. See infra Part III for discussion of its policy implications.
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services may also be exporting social costs that other governments
may have to address without the benefit of the tax revenues
traditionally generated by land-based gambling enterprises."' 103 Morse,
a gaming law expert, observes that many of the states that export
Internet gambling services have "relatively low percentages of
Internet penetration in their own markets." 10 4 This means that the
otherwise illicit activity can be insourced with very small negative
impact on local society. Indeed, production and its benefits are
internalized, while the service is exported and its costs are
externalized. In contrast, governments of export market states must
choose between joining the insourcing race by permitting Internet
gambling that will generate taxes to cover social costs on the one
hand-that is, to enjoy the benefits of production instead of merely
suffering the costs of consumption-and pursuing more aggressive
crime outsourcing policies to deflect the impact of foreign-based
activity on the other hand. 105
The U.S. response to this policy dilemma has resulted in an
interesting confluence of the international rules regulating the
globalization of legitimate economic activity and the globalization of
illicit activity. Due to aggressive enforcement policies aimed at
deterring foreign-based gaming services, 10 6 U.S. federal and state
gambling legislation has, for a number of years, stood at the center of
an important trade dispute at the WTO initiated by Antigua and
Barbuda, a major gaming insourcing state. In international litigation,
the WTO found the United States to be in violation of its obligations
under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"). 10 7
Until its legislation is compliant, the United States faces the prospect
of authorized retaliation by Antigua and Barbuda of over $20 million
per year. 108 The United States has preempted similar future WTO
103. Morse, supra note 101, at 531.
104. Id.
105. Note that a similar phenomenon may occur with respect to traditional casino gambling.
Several states that legalized gambling have done so only with respect to foreigners. This policy
allows these states to reap the benefits of gambling tourism, while minimizing the risk of
internal social problems that might be created by gambling. See Walter T. Champion, Jr., Is Da
Nang the Next Atlantic City? Why Vietnam is the Next Sure Thing in Casino Development, 11
GAMING L. REV. 714, 717 (2007) (Vietnamese casino open only to non-Vietnamese); Edward B.
Miller, An Oasis or Just a Mirage: The Jericho Casino and the Future of the Israeli Palestinian
Peace Process, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 33, 47 n.54 (2001) (Palestinian casino open only to
non-Palestinians).
106. See discussion infra Part III.B.
107. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gamblingand Betting Services, 123-27, WTIDS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
108. Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-BorderSupply of
Gambling and Betting Services-Recourse to Arbitrationby the United States Under Article 22.6 of
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complaints by negotiating a withdrawal of U.S. gaming-related GATS
commitments towards other interested parties, including the
European Union. 10 9 The United States has also enacted legislation
that aims to prevent Internet gambling in the United States not by
criminalizing gambling patrons and gaming services, but by making it
illegal for providers of credit card and online payment services to
accept and process transactions that they suspect to be online
wagers, 110 with clear detrimental effects on gaming insourcers."'
This is not, however, the end of the transnational gaming story.
Having been frustrated by U.S. policy in the attempt to use foreign
jurisdictions as offshore bases targeting the lucrative U.S. market for
gambling, online gaming enterprises are now reversing their strategy:
the latest trend is the establishment of gaming operations based (at
least at the corporate level) in the United States, but targeting
patrons in other jurisdictions-all the while complying with U.S.
criminal law, including the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act ("UIGEA"). For example, U.S.-based Yahoo! has launched Yahoo
Poker, 1 2 which is provided on Yahoofs United Kingdom and Ireland
website by St. Minver, a company licensed in Gibraltar but blocked by
Yahoo! itself in the United States. Here we see that a crime
outsourcing policy based on strict legislation and domestic
enforcement can coexist with an insourcing policy by separating the
costs and benefits of transnational illicit activity. Furthermore, we see
that regulatory policy has not only shifted the locus of the illicit
activity of providing gaming services, but has also contributed to the
displacement of gambling itself: gaming firms that have abandoned
the U.S. market are reporting significant growth in their revenues
from wagers placed in non-U.S. jurisdictions. 113
the DSU, 1, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); see also James Kanter & Gary Rivlin, In Trade
Ruling, Antigua Wins Right to Piracy,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at C3.
109. See EU Out of US Online Gambling Market, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at C7.
110. See generally Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act ("UIGEA"), Pub. L. 109347, 120 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5561 to 5567 (2006)). For a more indepth discussion applying legal regulation to intermediaries in this context, see generally Ronald
J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 239 (2005).
111. See US Gambling Legislation Hitting GibraltarJobs, GAMBLING PLANET, Nov. 7, 2006,
http://www.gamblingplanet.org/latest-news/10249
(claiming hundreds of online gambling
employees have been laid off in Gibraltar and India due to UIGEA); see also Simon Bowers,
Players Walk Away as US Law Wipes Out 90% of PartyGaming'sPoker Revenue, GUARDIAN, Oct.
17, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.ukbusiness/2006/oct/17/usnews.gambling (describing investor
response in leading online gaming firms after enactment of UIGEA).
112. Yahoo!
Poker
Online,
http://yahoopoker.stenodoc.com/yahoopoker/pokerhome/
index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
113. See Morse, supra note 101, at 531.
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3. Money Laundering
An additional example of the way transnational crime
displacement and attraction play out in local politics can be seen in
money laundering. Money laundering is "the process by which one
conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income,
and disguises that income to make it appear legitimate."' 114 This
process is conducted through an array of transactions involving
different financial institutions, at the end of which cash generated by
criminal activity (e.g., drug sales) is transformed into funds in a
private bank account that can be used for personal consumption at
best, or for other antisocial activities (e.g., funding terrorism) at
worst.116 Money laundering can therefore be viewed as a derivative
crime. The criminality of the financial transactions involved in
laundering depends on the criminality of the source of the funds being
laundered. On this basis, these transactions abuse bank secrecy and
other aspects of financial regulation to erase the criminal origins of
the funds.1 16 As part of an effort to fight money laundering, states
have adopted international agreements and national laws that both
prohibit different aspects of the laundering process and require
11 7
financial institutions to report suspicious transactions.
Once criminalized, money laundering is an activity
that
typifies the model we describe in this Article. Money launderers
engage in a business-like activity, which is purely motivated by
financial gain. In addition, the activity itself is highly mobile
worldwide. Unlike in the past, when criminals had to carry suitcases
filled with cash to nearby states, current technology allows for swift
and inexpensive money transfers that enable launderers to pick and

114. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND

MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984). For a definition embraced in the international community, see
G.A. Res. 55/25, art. 6(1)(a), U.N. Doc. A1RES/55/25 (Nov. 10, 2000), where money laundering is:
(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds
of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or
of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to
evade the legal consequences of his or her action;
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such
property is the proceeds of crime.
115. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of money laundering, see MarianoFlorentino Cullar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and
the Disruptionof CriminalFinance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 325-36 (2003).
116. Id.

117. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF') has pushed for many
of these initiatives. See sources cited supra note 12.
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choose the jurisdiction in which they will commit at least some
segments of the laundering.
In analyzing the political economy of money laundering, the
interesting players are the financial institutions. Financial
institutions have two incentives to ease money laundering regulation.
First, such regulation creates significant direct costs due to the vast
reporting requirements. Second, and more importantly, the
displacement of laundering to jurisdictions with lenient regulation
118
causes significant revenue losses for domestic financial institutions.
Thus, we see several examples of financial sector lobbying to ease or
prevent money laundering regulations. These examples include both
small and relatively undeveloped economies, in which the banking
industry contributes a relatively large part of the GDP, and larger
developed economies. 119 Even in the United States, until the attacks of
September 11, 2001 highlighted the connection between terrorism and
money laundering, the banking lobby managed to derail tough
legislative proposals on the matter.120
4. Sex Crimes
Finally, our argument can be extended even to the area of sex
crimes and the illicit sex trade. While sex crimes tend to be perceived
as having much to do with passion and urges and little to do with
rationality, in some cases, sex offenders-and those who satisfy their
118. See Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money
Laundering. A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and
Multilateral Policy Reforms, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 263, 274 (2003) (noting that it has been
reported that the Bank of New York made as much as $240 million per month in fees from
money laundering).
119. See, e.g., Judy Dempsey, Israel Plans to Act Against Money Laundering, FIN. TIMES
(Eng.), June 30, 2000, at 14 (noting an Israeli bank association's concern over "protecting the
privacy of the citizen"); Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Democracy in the Caribbean,53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 869, 873-74 (1999) (describing how banks prevent legislation in the Caribbean); Igor
Reichlin & Peter Galuszka, Germany's Brash New Import: Dirty Money, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 6,
1992, available at http://www.businessweek.comlarchives/1992/b326044.arc.htm (suggesting that
German legislation could "scare away customers"); Mark A. Uhlig, Panama Resisting Move to
Clean Up Banking System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at Al (reporting Panamian businessmen
were worried the legislation "would ruin the country's lucrative position as a tax haven and
dollar-based financial center").
120. See, e.g., George A. Lyden, The InternationalMoney LaunderingAbatement and AntiTerrorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While Giving Money Laundering
Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 201, 230-31 (2003) (noting that banks in the
United States traditionally opposed new legislation because it would bother them to compete
internationally); S. Selena Nelson, Regulating Money Laundering in the US and Honk-Kong: A
Post 9-11 Comparison, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 723, 735-39 (2007) (noting the stricter
U.S. legislation after 9-11 as an indication of the decline of the previously influential banking
lobby).
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demands-exhibit behavior completely in line with the rational choice
model. 121 The emerging international "sex tourism" market serves as
an example for this type of phenomenon. In the last few years, the
coupling of lower travel costs with the reduced search costs brought
about by the Internet have enabled people from developed states
interested in engaging in commercial sexual activity deemed abnormal
in their home states-including pedophilia-to travel to developing
states in which the expected sanction is significantly lower than in
their home states. As one Kenyan observer puts it, "Men who would
never visit brothels in their home countries for example, will end up
doing so in a foreign state where there is a negligible chance of
detection and (or) penalty." 122 That is to say, equal opportunities exist
in Western states, but the social and legal sanctions, and chances of
detection, are much higher there.
This type of crime displacement has put political pressure on
national legislators and law enforcement agencies to align their
policies with other states so as to not attract sex tourism. For
example, after British rocker Gary Glitter was sentenced to only three
years in jail for molesting two girls in Vietnam, local experts reacted
by noting that "[s]uch an outcome could reinforce a perception of lax
laws in Southeast Asia and attract foreign child molesters who face
tougher penalties at home."'123 Similarly, commentators in Thailand
have raised concerns that weak law enforcement and the low
probability of detection are drawing sex offenders to the state. 24 The
fear of sex tourism has caused states in Southeast Asia to become
aware that differences in policies among themselves can also affect sex
offenders' chosen destinations. For instance, Tjokorda Bagus of
Indonesia's Committee Against Sexual Abuse has noted that "[s]ince
Thailand has become more stern in [its] law enforcement, more
pedophiles are coming to Indonesia."1 25 We should note that given the
121. For a comprehensive analysis of an array of policy issues relating to sexual activity from
a rational choice perspective, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
122. Rose Kisia Omondi, Gender and the Political Economy of Sex Tourism in Kenya's
CoastalResorts 9 (Africa Regional Sexuality Resource Centre, Working Paper, 2003), availableat
http://www.arsrc.org/downloads/features/omondi.pdf.
123. Christopher Torchia, Child Sex Tourism Continues in Southeast Asia Despite Legal
Efforts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 11, 2006).
124. Thomas Bell, Thailand Police Arrest Suspected Paedophile, TELEGRAPH (Eng.), Oct. 20,
2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1566720Thailand-police-arrestsuspected-paedophile.html.
125. Torchia, supra note 123; see also Summary of the News: From Jan 19 to Jan 25, 2003,
BANGKOK POST, Jan. 26, 2003 (finding policymakers aware of sex crimes shifting from Thailand
to Cambodia and Bali as a result of new legislation); Thailand Under a Familiar Glare,
BANGKOK POST, Aug. 27, 2006 (pointing out that "child sex tourists are more likely to go to
Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, or Indonesia, where law enforcement is less strong").
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touristic nature of these crimes, the effects of legal reforms can be
global and not merely regional. A policy change in Southeast Asia can
simply cause a sex tourist to get on a flight to another part of the
globe. Indeed, a Kenyan government report recently pointed out that
sex tourism has moved to that African state from Asia as a result of
26
the different legal sanctions.1
It should be noted, though, that the phenomenon described
here is not limited to developing economies, as the case of the recent
increase in the age of sexual consent in Canada demonstrates. For
years, Canada set the age of consent at fourteen. This relatively low
age caused U.S. citizens who wanted to engage in sexual acts with
young teens to search for partners in Canada. For example, Michael
H. Simonson, a fifty-one-year-old man from the United States,
reportedly traveled to Canada to have sex with a fifteen-year-old girl
he met online. 127 Interestingly, a search of his computer revealed
extensive research into Canada's age of consent, demonstrating just
how rational sex offenders might be. Furthermore, as our theory
suggests, the legal arbitrage between the United States and Canada
played a role in the Canadian political debate over raising the age of
consent. As one Canadian supporter of a bill raising the age noted,
"We have sex tourism laws for Cambodia and Thailand, when in fact
we are becoming a sex tourism destination for America because of our
low age of consent laws." 128 Another bill supporter was quoted saying
"Canada has to send internationally a strong message that it is no
129
longer legal to have sex with 14 year-olds.
III. OPTIMAL INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL

We have demonstrated that crime control policies adopted by
individual states influence the global distribution of crime and
subsequently impact the crime control policies adopted by other

126. Patrick Mayoyo, Tour Firms 'In Child Sex War,'NATION (Kenya), Nov. 4, 2004.
127. Wash State Man Sentenced to 10 Years for Soliciting Teen Online, AP ALERT-IDAHO,
Oct. 25, 2006.
128. Ken Reed, Letter to the Editor, Age of Consent Should Be 16, COLLINGWOOD
CONNECTION (Can.), Nov. 25, 2005, at Al (quoting Member of Parliament Vic Toews); see also
Nancy Turley, Viewpoint, Age of Consent Should Protect Kids, CAMBRIDGE TIMES (Can.), July 4,
2006, at 6 ("Because Canada's age of consent is only 14, Canada has become a preferred
destination for predators to prey on innocent children."); Nancy Turley, Viewpoint, Salvation
Army Applauds FederalBill to Raise Age of Consent, STONEY CREEK NEWS (Can.), July 28, 2006,
at 9 (expressing support for the bill because it will "help prevent Canada from being a
destination for sex tourism").

129. Tory Government to Raise Age of Consent to 16 to Target Sex Predators,AP ALERTBus., Feb. 8, 2006 (quoting child protection advocate Roz Prober).
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states. We now turn to explore the normative and prescriptive
implications of these findings. We will set out a framework for
analyzing the efficiency of crime control measures adopted by states
acting in a globalized environment, employing theories of regulatory
competition and international cooperation. Although there are many
advantages associated with the current decentralized system of crime
control-based on sovereign domestic policies-the mobility of
transnational crime and the increasing interdependence of national
policies require an evaluation of the relative efficiencies of a broad
array of international policy instruments. These instruments range
from aggressive unilateralism and self-help, to informal and formal
intergovernmental cooperation, to more innovative legal regimes such
as international crime standards and the establishment of
international state responsibility for harms caused by transnational
crime. Moreover, different types of transnational crime represent
distinct sets of problems that require different international solutions.
Our characterization of international crime control races involving
either crime insourcing, crime outsourcing, or a heterogeneous
combination of both serves as a reference point for identifying the
form of international crime regulation that will be optimal in each
case.
A. The Normative Framework:Regulatory Competition and
InternationalCooperationand Regimes
When should states maintain full autonomy over the regulation
of criminal activity in their territory, and when-and how-should
they cooperate with other states? No less importantly, when will
states opt for either of these courses of action? In essence, these are
questions that can be framed in the complementary terms of both the
general theory of regulatory competition and institutional theories of
international cooperation.
1. Regulatory Competition
There is a longstanding debate on the efficiency of regulatory
competition. 130 The core question is to what degree policy decisions
should be allocated to regional or otherwise subordinate political units
versus to what extent they should be centralized. On one hand, some
view competition as a desirable means to promote the efficient supply

130. For an updated introduction to the topic, see COOTER, supra note 23, at 127-48.
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of public goods by governments. 131 Much like in other market settings,
regulatory competition functions as a check on the monopoly power of
central authority and helps promote individual welfare. 132 The
normative conclusion stemming from this line of thought is that this
market, much like other competitive markets, should be left
unregulated. 33 On the international level, this approach agitates
against international harmonization and centralization and towards
the preservation of national decisionmaking autonomy, with states
1 34
acting as competitive agents.
On the other side of the debate are those who argue that
regulatory competition is inefficient.1 3 5 These scholars point out that
agents making regulatory decisions within their jurisdictions face
collective action problems caused by strategic interdependence with
the effects of policies made in other jurisdictions.1 36 In these
situations, often framed as noncooperative games such as the

131. See Tiebout supra note 24, at 424. For an example of a later optimistic view on
regulatory competition in the area of environmental regulation, see Revesz, supra note 25, at
1233-44.
132. See COOTER, supranote 23, at 128.
133. See Tiebout, supra note 24, at 422 ("Just as the consumer may be visualized as walking
to a private market place to buy his goods, the prices of which are set, we place him in the
position of walking to a community where prices (taxes) of community services are set.").
134. To be sure, scholars who have applied the theory of regulatory competition to
international affairs are not opposed to international harmonization of substantive norms as
such, but rather examine the optimal balance between harmonization and competition on an
issue-specific basis. See generally REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) [hereinafter Esty &
Geradin]. Moreover, a strong case for international regulatory competition based on the
allocation of horizontal (i.e., interstate) regulatory jurisdiction is made by Trachtman. See Joel P.
Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction,34 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 47 (1993); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdictionin
InternationalSecurities Regulation, in Esty & Geradin, supra, at 289. We acknowledge that the
application of Tiebout's model to international affairs is not without difficulty. Tiebout assumed
labor mobility, which permitted individuals to move to the local jurisdiction whose policies best
suited their preferences. Tiebout, supra note 24, at 419. Labor mobility is much more restricted
in the international setting, so ostensibly this parameter of the theory of regulatory competition
is not met. However, the mobility of transnational crime in a globalized environment does not
depend on the movement of people. See supra Part I.B. Moreover, as Trachtman notes in his
analysis of international securities regulation, "the parameters [of the Tiebout model] are never
completely met, placing us in the realm of the theory of the second best." Trachtman, Regulatory
Competition and Regulatory Jurisdictionin InternationalSecuritiesRegulation, supra,at 289.
135. For a few examples of skepticism with respect to the efficiency of regulatory
competition, see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady
Path"-A Theory of JudicialEnforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995); Scott R.
Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, "Factsare Stubborn Things" An Empirical Reality Check in the
Theoretical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998).
136. Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 135, at 1470-75.
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prisoner's dilemma,137 the agents might prefer to reach a cooperative
solution, yet each agent's individual interest is to defect, leading to an
inefficient equilibrium in which all group members defect. 138 Thus,
some type of limitation on the ability of jurisdictions to compete
among themselves can be justified from an efficiency perspective.
In practice, both of these extreme positions should be qualified.
The optimal structure of regulation or competition depends on the
specific circumstances. The regulatory market can function as an
efficient method for supplying public goods, as long as a series of
conditions are satisfied. Importantly, one necessary condition is a lack
of externalities. 139 Thus, the focus of our discussion shifts to the
existence of externalities. 140 If externalities exist in the area of crime
control, they will undermine the efficiency of the regulatory market.
Thus, states may require centralized policies to deal effectively with
those externalities.
There are two main advantages to a regulatory market for
crime control. First, the competitive pressures created by a
decentralized international market for crime control can increase the
efficiency of domestic crime control policies. States that do not develop
a well-functioning and effective law enforcement system will be driven
to adopt efficient crime control policies as their crime rate increases
because of incoming displacement. Furthermore, competitive forces
will drive states to innovate and develop new ways to combat crime.' 4'
Each state consequently functions as a "laboratory" in which new
crime control policies are tested and later adopted by other states if
successful.142
137. For a complete explanation about the prisoner's dilemma, see Saleska & Engel, supra
note 135, at 55 n.2.
138. Id.
139. In his model of regulatory competition, Tiebout explicitly assumed away all
externalities. See Tiebout, supra note 24, at 419. A transnational externality emerges when
"actions by one state create an uncompensated interdependency for other nations." TODD
SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 69 (2004).

140. For a similar framework evaluating the efficiency of regulatory competition and
externalities with respect to corporate law, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1435, 1485-95 (1992).
141. See Craig Volden, Entrusting the States with Welfare Reform, in THE NEW FEDERALISM
65, 78-86 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997) (reviewing the connection between
federalism and innovation).
142. In the American context, the concept of the states as "experimental laboratories" for
public policy has been a powerful justification for federalism. The term was originally coined by
Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
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A second advantage of international decentralization is that it
permits governments to adopt policies that are tailored to the
preferences of their specific constituencies. This is desirable not only
from the perspective of efficiency (because preferences are better
satisfied), but also from the viewpoint of democratic legitimacy. 14
Moral diversity and distinct social norms might lead different states to
regulate the same activities differently. 144 Decentralizing the control
over criminal justice allows communities that have different views on
issues such as prostitution and the definition of illicit drugs to design
regulation that best fits their preferences. Similarly, communities can
differ as to the manner and magnitude of appropriate punishment for
non-consequentialist reasons. For example, one state might view the
death penalty as morally repugnant while another might see it as the
appropriate way to punish criminals. 45 Decentralizing control over
these decisions allows communities to adopt what they deem the
appropriate sanction.
Yet, decentralizing crime control also has significant
drawbacks that stem from some of the pathologies of markets. The
central insight of our positive analysis is that crime control policies
adopted by states do, in fact, create externalities. There are two types
of externalities that these policies create. First, some crimes
committed in states create harm in other states. This is the case, for
instance, when an illicit drug is manufactured in one state and
consumed in another. In such cases, crime control efforts in the states
in which crime originates create positive externalities by reducing
harm in other states; crime control failures of such states create
negative externalities by increasing harm in other states. 146 Second, as
143. This is the central argument in favor of subsidiarity in international regulation as a
principle whereby decisions should be taken at the lowest, and most specialized, possible level.
'The more local and the more specialized an international norm is, the better its legitimacy, or
its 'compliance pull.' " Andreas L. Paulus, Subsidiarity, Fragmentationand Democracy: Towards
the Demise of General International Law?, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 193, 193

(Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
144. Interestingly, there is great convergence regarding how communities judge different
crimes. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implicationsfor Criminal
Law and JusticePolicy, 81 S.CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (2007) (reviewing studies on the matter).
145. Note that the non-consequentialist views with respect to sanctioning may have
consequentialist implications to the extent that people's welfare is affected by the
appropriateness of the sanctions assessed to criminals. For a connection between nonconsequentialist views and welfare economics, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 21-23 (2002) (presenting the concept of a taste for fairness).
146. This claim is tied to a long line of criminological studies that point out the positive
diffusion of law enforcement efforts from one area to another. See generally Ronald V. Clarke &
David Weisburd, Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of
Displacement, 2 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 165 (1994).
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we have seen, crime control efforts in one state cause criminal activity
to be displaced to other states. In such cases, the crime control efforts
of one state cause a negative externality in other states. This is the
case, for example, when the production and consumption of illicit
drugs move to another state because of tough regulation.
Importantly, from a normative perspective, these externalities
can lead states acting in a dynamic globalized setting to equilibrium,
in which they adopt suboptimal crime control policies that do not
maximize aggregate welfare. Indeed, these are precisely the situations
we have described above as outsourcing and insourcing races, as
explained in further detail below.
Finally, our analysis of the efficiency of decentralization is not
complete without referring to its distributional aspects. The
regulatory market-much like other competitive markets-measures
agents' willingness to pay based on their initial endowments and not
their actual expected welfare gains. 147 For instance, in an organ
market, the fact that a rich person will be willing to pay more than a
poor person to acquire a heart only reflects the rich person's higher
ability to pay. It does not represent a higher valuation of the heart. A
large body of public finance literature has analyzed the fiscal
disparities associated with decentralization. 148 In general, this
literature points out that decentralization brings about inequalities
that benefit wealthier groups. In the area of crime control, poor states
might suffer tremendously from the adverse affects of cross-border
crime being displaced into them, but they might be unable to invest
the resources necessary to keep up with other states. Most states
simply cannot afford to indulge in the per capita incarceration rate
that the United States currently maintains, even if they wish to use
49
this method to increase expected sanctions in their territories.
Indeed, it is not surprising that less developed states are most often
prone to suffer from crime outsourcing, as the examples of meth
150
production and sex tourism have shown.

147. See generally, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
148. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Federalism and Fiscal Equity, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 583
(1950). In the American context this issue has manifested itself through the debate over the
desirability of federal grants to the states. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox of
Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restrictions of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90
GEO. L.J. 461 (2002).
149. The United States currently has the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world.
Robert Batey, The Cost of Judicial Restraint: Forgone Opportunities to Limit America's
Imprisonment Binge, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 29 (2007).
150. See supra notes 84-88, 121-29 and accompanying text.
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2. International Cooperation and Regime Theory
The above analysis suggests that for transnational criminal
activity, enforcement-related externalities and inefficiencies result
from the absence of centralized international crime control. If these
conclusions were related to crime insourcing and outsourcing among
political units of a federal state, rather than among autonomous
states, our general prescriptive recommendation would be to
consolidate crime control policy within the federal government, at
least to the extent necessary to remove inefficiencies. However, we are
discussing international crime control. In contrast to a federal
environment, the international political system is characterized by
anarchy, that is, the absence of central authority. 151 Full regulatory
centralization, let alone formal crime control centralization, is clearly
not a viable option in the contemporary international environment in
which state sovereignty remains a fundamental principle. 152 The
negation of externalities and the removal of inefficiencies in the
regulation of transnational crime must therefore be achieved through
other means. We now take our analysis a step further, into
International Relations ("IR") theory, to examine possible efficient
alternatives to formally centralized crime control. We will focus on the
effects of unilateral policies and international cooperative regimes.' 53
Roughly stated, IR theory has three streams of thought:
realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. Each theory has a
different explanation for the emergence of international regimes.
Realists see the state as the primary actor in international relations,
151. In articulating the "security dilemma" pervasive among nuclear powers, John Herz
referred to "anarchic society" as "a fundamental social constellation, one where a plurality of
otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units of political life, that is, where groups
live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity." John Herz, Idealist
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, 2 WORLD POL. 157, 157 (1950); see also HEDLEY
BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977).

152. In considering the prospects for international harmonization of rules regarding
domestic regulatory subsidies, Trachtman notes that "[w]e may assume that international
society is unprepared for such an effort toward 'essential harmonization' on any comprehensive
basis." Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction,
supra note 134, at 102. This is a fortiori true in the even more sensitive areas of criminal
regulation. See SANDLER, supra note 139, at 161 (noting that "autonomy has great sway over
nation-states, particularly when it comes to law enforcement").
153. According to Krasner's classic definition, international regimes are implicit or explicit
"principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors' expectations
converge in a given [area of international relations]." Stephen D. Krasner, StructuralCauses and
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). For discussion of the definition of international regimes, see
ANDREAS HASENCLEVER, PETER MAYER & VOLKER RITTBERGER, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 8-22 (1997).
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framing it as a rational, self-interested, and welfare-maximizing
unitary actor. The realist's state is interested in relative gain and
154
operates in a competitive, power-based international environment.
Realists are skeptical about international cooperation, preferring to
explain the emergence of international regimes in the power-based
terms of theories such as hegemonic stability, in which the dominance
of a great power allows it to provide the regime as a collective good to
the international community, 155 either benevolently or coercively.156
Neoliberals, or liberal institutionalists, share the realists' view
of the state as a rational egoist. 157 However, they do not consider the
state to be driven by a quest for power and relative gain in comparison
to other states.15 8 Crucially, where realists see international regimes
as based on power structures, neoliberals consider regimes to be
predicated on the interests of all participating actors in the creation
and maintenance of the regime. On this basis, neoliberalism models
the strategic constellations of state interests in particular issue areas
to explain the structure of cooperation that might emerge.1 59 Primarily
based on prisoner's dilemma models,1 60 neoliberal explanations of
international cooperative regimes employ a broader set of game theory
models.161
Constructivists are dissatisfied with the assumptions of state
rationality that guide both the realist and neoliberalist approaches,
stressing instead the role of shared normative beliefs in shaping state
behavior. As a result, they emphasize the role of knowledge and
learning, arguing that epistemic communities and transnational
expert networks with shared values shape the perceptions of political

154. See Abbott, supra note 27, at 348-51; Slaughter, supra note 27, at 381.
155. A crude formulation of hegemonic stability theory in the era of the 1980s is provided in
Charles P. Kindleberger, Dominance and Leadership in the InternationalEconomy: Exploitation,
Public Goods and Free Rides, 25 INT'L STUD. Q. 242 (1981). A critique and nuanced application of
the concept is provided in ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).

156. See Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG. 579 (1985)
(criticizing hegemonic stability theory and distinguishing between its benevolent and coercive
strands).
157. See KEOHANE, supra note 155, at 67.

158. Id. at 27; see also HASENCLEVER, MAYER & RITTBERGER, supra note 153, at 26.
159. See KEOHANE, supra note 155, at 25-26 (explaining why a study of international
regimes should focus on states).
160. See id. at 68-69 (summarizing the prisoner's dilemma model).
161. For an overview of game theory applications to IR, see Duncan Snidal, The Game
Theory of InternationalPolitics, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY, supra note 28, at 25.
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actors who guide state behavior in ways that are at times inconsistent
162
with the rational choice framework.
Each of these approaches has implications for the study of
transnational crime and the design of international crime control. For
example, the realist mindset is most evident in Andreas and
Nadelmann's assertion that global crime control is in essence a
hegemonic program pursued through mainly benevolent methods. 163
Alternative explanations express constructivist tendencies, such as
Lbwenheim's sophisticated approach towards "persistent agents of
transnational harm": transnational non-state actors (e.g., pirates,
drug traffickers, and terrorists) who trigger fierce sovereign reaction
64
when they threaten the moral norms of the state.
The normative framework we have set out above best
correlates with the neoliberal institutionalist approach. In our
analysis, national crime control policies are formulated by each state
mainly in consideration of its (self-defined) interests. The negative
externalities states impose on one another through their crime control
policies are not, in the main, deliberately intended to inflict
transnational harm or to achieve an advantage in purely realist terms
of power (at least, we have not seen any indication of such attitudes in
our case studies of drugs, money laundering, gambling, and the sex
trade). The realist framework is, therefore, less relevant to a general
understanding of international crime. And while a constructivist view
would highlight internationally shared norms regarding crime and
shared knowledge of law enforcement (perhaps typified by Interpol), 165
we are most interested in those cases in which there exists
international normative diversity, and in which crime control remains
a matter for domestic authorities.
Thus, in evaluating existing and proposed solutions to the
inefficiencies of international decentralized crime control, we combine
the insights of regulatory competition theory and of IR theory.

162. See Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities, World Order and the
Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT'L ORG. 367 (1992) (generally discussing the use
of epistemic communities in studying international theory).
163. ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 13, at 243 ("[I]t would not be too much of an
exaggeration to say that much of the internationalization of crime control has in practice meant
Americanization.... For the United States, exercising policing hegemony through international
institutions enhances legitimacy, is easier and less costly than the raw exercise of power.").
164. ODED LOWENHEIM, PREDATORS AND PARASITES: PERSISTENT AGENTS OF TRANSNATIONAL
HARM AND GREAT POWER AUTHORITY (2007).

165. See supra note 12.
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B. EvaluatingExisting and Suggested Solutions

1. Outsourcing Races
In outsourcing races, or races to strictness, interacting states
are interested in reducing the amount of local crime production. As a
result, they tend to adopt crime control policies that are harsher than
those they would have adopted had the states operated in isolation
from one another. The resultant crime displacement creates an
international crime control arms race. Domestically, this may lead to
inefficiencies associated with over-enforcement. 166 For example, states
might invest inefficiently high amounts of resources in funding their
police forces in an attempt to raise the probability of detection, rather
than funding other public goods (e.g., health care, education, etc.) that
do not create negative externalities in other states. In game theory
terms, such states are situated in a prisoner's dilemma. 167 No
outsourcing state can afford unilaterally to relax its domestic
enforcement because to do so will create crime displacement from
counterpart states with high levels of enforcement. A more centralized
international crime control regime would prevent this inefficient
regulatory competition since the central planner would internalize all
of the effects of the crime control policies it adopts.
The prisoner's dilemma faced by crime-outsourcing states is
not, however, unresolvable. Game theory1 68 and its international
regime applications 169 predict that the emergence of international
cooperation is more likely when the game is iterated and when certain
additional circumstantial and institutional conditions exist. Clearly,
166. Under an economic perspective on crime control, there is an efficient (usually positive)
level of crime in society, and investing resources in order to reduce crime below this point is
socially wasteful. For the development of this idea, see Becker, supra note 22, at 180-85
(deriving the optimal level of crime).
167. Sandler briefly presents the phenomenon analyzed here as an example of an
international collective action problem. See SANDLER, supra note 139, at 160.
168. There is a wealth of literature on this subject. The pathbreaker in the field was Robert
Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390 (1981)
(focusing on reciprocal "tit-for-tat" strategies). For similar arguments, see also ROBERT AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of CooperationAmong
Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306 (1981). The role of additional factors in the facilitation of
cooperation-such as the number of players, the range of possible choices, variation in the payoff
structure, noise, the shadow of the future, population dynamics, and population structure-is
consolidated in Robert Axelrod & Douglas Dion, The Further Evolution of Cooperation, 242
SCIENCE 1385 (1988).

169. See Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226 (1985); Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in
InternationalRelations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1 (1986).
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crime control policymaking is not a one-shot decision; states are,
therefore, repeat players. Thus, the potential long-term benefits
associated with cooperation can cause states to adopt policies that are
mutually beneficial despite the short-term tendency to defect by
inefficiently outsourcing crime.
Cooperative policies might emerge spontaneously, without
formal agreement. Just like neighbors in local settings, 170 states can
achieve cooperation without formal legal mechanisms. Such policies
have the advantage of retaining the semblance of sovereignty and
independent decisionmaking. Alternatively, under the right
conditions, states can opt for more formal coordination and
cooperation. Cooperation in crime outsourcing races is thus a
possibility. We must ask, then, what the substance of such cooperation
should be to achieve efficiency.
The best policy recommendation that emerges from our
analysis of crime outsourcing races is, in our view, straightforward:
states should agree upon a set of maximum criminal standards that
they may not exceed. These standards can define offenses (the
threshold of criminalization), regulate the severity of criminal
sanctions, and set levels of enforcement. Such agreements would allow
states to maintain predefined optimal levels of crime and crime control
in different issue areas, without imposing externalities on each other,
and without wasting resources that could be redirected to other social
ends.
In realistic terms, however, we must acknowledge that there
are several reasons that such a system would not be adopted by
sovereign states. First, the concept of inefficiently excessive crime
control measures runs against the basic intuition of most people who
view crime as inherently bad and any measure adopted against it as
necessarily good. Consider, by analogy, that many private crime
control measures adopted by individuals are potentially inefficient
17 1
since they are observable and only bring about crime displacement.
Nonetheless, authorities are usually reluctant to regulate such private
crime control measures and do not prevent people from protecting
their private spheres in any way they see fit. If the authority of the

170. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE

DISPUTES (1991) (documenting cooperative social norms among neighbors in Shasta County,
California).
171. See, e.g., Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Gated Communities and the
Economic Geography of Crime, 46 J. URB. ECON. 80 (1999) (analyzing the inefficiencies
associated with gated communities); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft:
Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991) (presenting a

general model of the issue).
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state is mostly uncontested in the state-citizen constellation, the
possibility of regulating states' efforts to reduce their own crime rates
through cooperative in.t.'rnational maximum standards would, a
fortiori, be slim.
Second, even if there were an international consensus (global
or regional) on the legitimacy of setting maximum crime control
standards, as a practical matter such an exercise would be a daunting
task. As we have seen, criminals are sensitive to an array of policy
variables that determine the expected costs of crime. Thus,
international maximum standards would have to account for an
assortment of issues such as the probability of detection, the
probability of conviction, and the level of sanctions. 172 Regulating all of
these dimensions on the international level is clearly a significant
challenge.
These problems have led to the current situation in which
there are, to our knowledge, no existing examples of international
maximum standards in the area of criminal law. Instead,
international efforts aimed at cooperation in crime control focus on
setting minimum standards. 173 While minimum standards might be
justified to deal with problems created by insourcing and the resulting
races to leniency (as we discuss below), ignoring the symmetric
problem associated with outsourcing crime is difficult to justify.
Given the impractical nature of setting maximum criminal
standards, we turn to explore second-best alternatives that in the long
term could be more achievable as international normative regimes
designed to increase the efficiency of crime control. One option that
might be more palatable to policymakers is the establishment of
international maximum criminal enforcement standards from which
states are allowed to stray in certain circumstances. Two models from
international trade regulation-safeguards 74 and Sanitary and

172. Note that even easily comparable measures such as average prison terms might be
difficult to compare once you take into account that different prison conditions might create
different deterrence levels. See Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison
Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003) (exploring
the deterrence value of harsh prison conditions).
173. See infra Part III.B.2.
174. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/25-safeg.pdf; General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
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Phytosanitary ("SPS") measures175-might serve as useful models in
this respect.
First, according to WTO law, states agree to set maximum
levels of import protection, but under an escape clause they are
allowed to impose safeguard measures, which temporarily raise trade
barriers in the case of an unforeseen increase in imports of any
product that is causing, or which is likely to cause, serious injury to
their industry. 176 Analogously, states could agree to a maximum
penalty for a drug offense as an international standard. This would
generally reduce negative externalities and prevent inefficient overenforcement. However, if faced with unforeseen, increased drug
offense rates within their jurisdictions, states would be permitted to
increase the penalty and the level of enforcement temporarily. Just as
the trade safeguards clause was instrumental in encouraging
decisionmakers to lower trade protection, 77 so might a crime control
safeguard permit decisionmakers to agree on maximum levels of
criminal enforcement.
Second, under the SPS Agreement, WTO members privilege
nonbinding international public health standards set by expert
groups. However, states retain the right to set higher standards,
provided that they are based on scientific risk assessment.17 8 In crime
control, we envision an international group of crime experts setting an
optimal standard of enforcement and sanction. States would then
commit either to follow this standard or to provide sufficient evidence
that this standard is insufficient within their jurisdiction. In any case,
such a standard would provide states with a benchmark for
international coordination.

175. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS], availableat
http://www.wto.org/englishldocs e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf.
176. See GATT, supra note 174, art. XIX.
177. See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a 'Safeguard.-A Positive Analysis of the GATT
'EscapeClause' with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
178. The SPS preamble and SPS Article 3.4 refer to international expert groups such as "the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the relevant

international and regional organizations operating within the framework of the International
Plant Protection Convention." SPS Article 3.2 establishes a presumption that SPS measures
conforming to international standards are SPS consistent; but SPS Article 3.3 permits WTO
members to introduce higher standards of protection if they are scientifically justified. SPS
Article 5 sets out the rules for scientific risk assessment that might justify such higher
standards. For detailed commentary of the SPS agreement and its WTO case law, see JOANNE
ScoTT, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES: A COMMENTARY
(2007).
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An alternative program that could optimize international crime
control where races to strictness emerge would not set an
international enforcement standard at all. Rather, states would agree
to a liability rule (or establish it on international customary law) that
would require compensation where one state could prove that an
excessively high level of criminal enforcement had caused
transnational harm by displacing crime to another national
jurisdiction. 179 This is analogous to the international community's
acknowledgement of the legal consequences of transnational
environmental harm in the 1930s.18 0 Conceptually, negative crime
enforcement externalities are similar to the exportation of
environmental costs, even if they result from over-enforcement. We
are not oblivious to the procedural and analytical problems that such a
legal regime would raise.18 ' However, in the absence of agreement on
maximum criminal standards, we consider this idea worthy of further
exploration.
Finally, some aspects of crime outsourcing can be dealt with
through the unilateral broadening of the criminal jurisdiction of
outsourcing states. In general, international law recognizes five
distinct justifications for the assertion of a state's national criminal
jurisdiction: (1) territorial, (2) nationality of the perpetrator, (3)
82
nationality of the victim, (4) protective, and (5) universal.
Nonetheless, Anglo-American criminal law traditionally has tended to
minimize the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction and has instead
focused on crimes committed within the jurisdiction.8 13 This tradition
has been neglected in recent years as the United States and other
179. For a similar proposal in the context of local governments, see Amnon Lehavi,
Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929 (2006).
180. We refer to the famous Trail Smelter arbitration. See Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal
Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939); Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L
L. 684 (1941). For contemporary analysis, see TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russel A. Miller eds.,
2006) [hereinafter TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].

181. It has been argued that the Trail Smelter "polluter pays" principle cannot be extended
to the effects of drug trafficking, because its transnational harms are more complex, diffuse, and
causally attenuated than environmental harm. See Judith Wise & Eric L. Jensen, International
Drug Pollution? Reflections on Trail Smelter and Latin American Drug Trafficking, in
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 180, at 281. However, we do not

consider this analysis definitive; similar arguments could have been raised against international
environmental accountability at the time of its establishment. In any case, Wise and Jensen
address problems caused by under-enforcement, not over-enforcement.
182. See Eric Cafritz & Omer Tene, Article 113-7 of the French Penal Code: The Passive
PersonalityPrinciple,41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 586 (2003).
183. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, ConstitutionalLimits on ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and InternationalLaw, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 12629 (2007).
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states have prosecuted their nationals who commit crimes outside of
their home jurisdiction, even if these crimes have few consequences
within the home jurisdiction. The most prominent example is the
trend of several states enacting laws that criminalize illicit sexual
conduct practiced extraterritorially18 4 These new laws, aimed at
fighting the growing sex tourism industry, function under the
assumption that several developing countries simply cannot generate
sufficient deterrence to combat these crimes. Thus, developed
countries from which sex tourists originate attempt to provide
additional deterrence by sanctioning offenders at their end. When sex
offenders face sanctions in their home countries, the incentives for
displacement are diminished because offenders face the same sanction
no matter where they commit their crimes. Hence, competition
between target states is expected to decrease as the crime control
measures they adopt become the less important policy variable.
2. Insourcing Races
In the case of outsourcing, the normative analysis is relatively
straightforward, because by definition states are not interested in
hosting the regulated activity. Insourcing poses more difficult
normative problems. In insourcing races, or races to leniency, states
are interested in attracting elements of transnational criminal activity
that they perceive as desirable-usually the production of crime, but
not its consumption. In these cases, the value of different policies
depends on the scope of externalities they impose and the benefits
they generate. If negative externalities are relatively small, then one
might view regulatory competition as a positive means to achieve
legislative diversity. This may be the case with respect to consumption
activities that take place within the producing jurisdiction itself (e.g.,
local drug consumption, gambling in physical casinos, etc.). If, on the
other hand, negative externalities imposed on other states are
significant, then competition will drive states to an inefficient outcome
in which the level of crime is excessive. This might be the case with
respect to unregulated online gambling, where the vast majority of
states might actually want to outlaw the practice. Given the
competitive nature of regulation, these states realize they will suffer
from the harms associated with the activity in any event and might as
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006) (criminalizing illicit sexual conducts outside of the United
States). Section 2423(c) was upheld against a constitutional challenge in United States v. Clark,
435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). For a review of the legislation, see Naomi L. Svensson, Note,
ExtraterritorkalAccountability: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Child Sex Tourism Laws, 28
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 641 (2006).
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well reap its benefits. Thus, few states will regulate these activities.
The consequence is a reduction of aggregate welfare that a more
centralized international system could avoid.
The combination of local benefits from crime and crime's
accompanying negative externalities may trigger an insourcing race,
risking the emergence of excessive crime rates. Such situations, in
game-theoretic terms, are assurance games or stag hunts, not a
prisoner's dilemma; in assurance games or stag hunts, the payoffs of
mutual cooperation (e.g., in the form of minimum standard setting)
are greater than the maximum payoff of unilateral defection. And,
unilateral defection creates an equilibrium in which all of the actors
have defected rationally-leading to an even lower payoff in the shape
18 5
of higher (and costlier) crime rates.
In such situations, institutional IR theory calls for
international cooperation to create incentives for states to raise
criminal sanctions and enhance enforcement. Unlike the outsourcing
race, however, there are fewer political barriers to setting minimum
standards with respect to crime control, because the political economy
of local crime control policies tends to foster support for almost any
initiative that raises sanctions. 18 6 Thus, we find several salient
examples for such international cooperation already in existence.
The European case is perhaps the most developed, satisfying
many of the theoretical preconditions for cooperation: the selectivity of
group membership, the structure of the population, and the existence
of a tested institutional structure for cooperation.1 8 7 The member
states of the European Union have developed and established not only
88
an agreed upon central criminal intelligence agency, the Europol,
but also a specialized agency for inter-judicial and prosecutorial
cooperation, the Eurojust. 18 9 Furthermore, under the European
Union's second pillar of Justice and Home Affairs ("JHA"),1 9°
European Union member states have undertaken legislative projects
185. On the "assurance" or "stag hunt" game, see HASENCLEVER, MAYER & RITTBERGER,
supra note 153, at 49-50.
186. See Stuntz, supra note 26, at 523-29.
187. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 169, at 147-54.
188. On the development of Europol, see Monica den Boer, Law-Enforcement Cooperation
and Transnational Organized Crime in Europe, in TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: BUSINESS AS USUAL? 103, 103-06 (Mats Berdal & M6nica Serrano

eds., 2002).
189. See Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, Setting Up Eurojust with a View to Reinforcing the
Fight Against Serious Crime, 2002 O.J. (L 63) 1.
190. On JHA in the EU, see Klaus Eder & Hans-Jbrg Trenz, The Making of a European
Public Space: The Case of Justice and Home Affairs, in LINKING EU AND NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
111 (Beate Kohler-Koch ed., 2003).
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aimed at harmonizing and approximating national crime control and
related policies in several areas, such as organized crime, drugs,
money laundering, cybercrime, and trafficking in firearms. 191 The
rationale of these efforts follows the logic of our theory, aiming at the
reduction of externalities caused by differential national policies,
192
leading to the creation of a more efficient joint crime control policy.
Thus, there exists European Union legislation that establishes
minimum provisions for criminal penalties related to drug offenses. 193
Note, however, that while such cooperative policies might overcome
the crime control arbitrage associated with insourcing problems, they
would be counterproductive if states are actually facing an
outsourcing problem.194 The European model does not appear sensitive
enough to this possibility.
On the multilateral international level, cooperation in crime
control is less developed than in Europe but similarly focuses on
issues associated with insourcing crime. Most formal international
criminal cooperation is a reciprocal exercise in enabling states to
impose their sovereign authority in areas of criminal enforcement,
such as extradition, legal assistance, and mutual recognition and
transfers of convicted persons.1 9 5 Where there are attempts to set
international crime control standards, they tend to be of the nature of
minimum standards. A central example is the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime ("CATOC"), the
191. For an overview, see the website of the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and
Security of the European Commission, EUROPA, Justice and Home Affairs-Freedom, Security
and Justice, http://ec.europa.eujustice-home/fsj/intro/fsj-intro-en.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
192. See, e.g., EUROPA, Justice and Home Affairs-Freedom, Security and JusticeCriminal Justice, http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/criminal/fsj_criminalintro-en.htm
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2009) ("The functioning of the European judicial area could be undermined by
differences between national criminal legislation. Approximation of legislation is needed to avoid
criminals using differences between national legislations legislation [sic] to operate from one EU
country toward others ....); see also Memorandum from the General Secretariat of the Council
of the European Union to the European Council, EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012), at 5 (Nov. 22,
2004), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st15/st15074.enO4.pdf ("Member
States should consider the impact of their national strategies on other Member States, the ways
national strategies of different Member States can be mutually supportive ....
").
193. See Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JAI of 25 October 2005, Laying Down
Minimum Provisions on the Constituent Elements of Criminal Acts and Penalties in the Field of
Illicit Drug Trafficking, 2004 O.J. (L 335) 8.
194. This is, no doubt, part of the crime control problem of drugs in Europe, which is in part
an outsourcing race and in part a heterogeneous race. See Caroline Chatwin, Drug Policy
Developments Within the European Union: The Destabilizing Effects of Dutch and Swedish
Policies, 43 BRIT. J. CRIM. 567 (2003) (discussing the effects of divisions in policy styles among
European Union member states).
195. See Matti Joutsen, International Instruments on Cooperation in Responding to
TransnationalCrime, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE 255 (Philip Reichel
ed., 2005).
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1 96
main international instrument aimed at combating organized crime.
The CATOC establishes an obligation upon signatory states to
criminalize participation in organized criminal groups, 197 and then
requires states to make the relevant offenses "liable to sanctions that
take into account the gravity of the offense." This would seem to leave
states with a good deal of crime control discretion. However, another
provision requires states party to the CATOC to "endeavour to ensure
that any discretionary legal powers under its domestic law relating to
the prosecution of persons for offences covered ... are exercised to
maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures."'198 Although
the real effect of this provision is questionable, being somewhat of a
soft "best efforts" obligation, it clearly encourages states to increase
their enforcement measures. The CATOC and similarly worded
international treaties'9 9 thus focus mainly on insourcing. They do not
restrain the tendency of outsourcing states to over-enforce; rather,
they legitimize it.
The cooperational problems associated with insourcing crime
can also result in the strategic use of policy tools aimed at structuring
the incentives of insourcing states. In the domestic sphere, a common
legal response to individuals who create negative externalities is the
use of penalties to alter their incentives. Tools such as tort law,
criminal law, and taxation set prices that can structure people's
behavior in an efficient way. In the area of international cooperation,
by extension, the use of such incentives can be difficult, since

196. See CATOC, supra note 6.
197. Id. art. 5(1). The CATOC also criminalizes money-laundering, id. art. 6, and certain
forms of corruption, id. art. 8; however, this would appear to be consistent with the view that
states might consider these activities to be "desirable," and so a minimum standard is in order.
198. Id. art. 11(2) (emphasis added). McClean points out that this provision is virtually
identical to Article 3, Paragraph 6 of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493. See DAVID MCCLEAN,
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: A COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION AND ITS
PROTOCOLS 133 (2007). Importantly for our purposes, McClean notes that "the authors of this
proposal were concerned that withdrawal of charges, or plea-bargains as to the level of offence or
the likely sanction might be secured by improper means." Id..
199. The U.N. has adopted several Protocols that apply the CATOC's general provisions,
including Article 11, to a series of transnational criminal problems, such as human trafficking.
See Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. AfRES/55/255 (May 31, 2001);
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex III, U.N.
Doc. AIRES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov.
15, 2000).
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generally, the international community has a limited ability to enforce
sanctions legitimately on sovereign states. Thus, in the international
context we observe a unique use of both negative incentives ("sticks")
and positive ones ("carrots") to achieve the desired outcome.
A concrete example of a non-unilateral regime that is based
mostly on carrots can be found in the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). The OECD is a compact and
essentially elite international organization whose members are the
developed global economies. While membership in the organization
might have few direct payoffs, it is seen as a stamp of approval for
emerging economies and carries an array of indirect benefits. Thus,
states have an incentive to comply with the requirements for
admission to the organization. This, in turn, enables the OECD to
cause states to adopt policies that may run against their own narrow
interests. For example, Israel has recently adopted serious reforms in
areas such as intellectual property protection and money laundering
to comply with the OECD requirements. These reforms led the OECD
to open a formal discussion on accession with Israel in May 2007.200
Notably, several of the standards to which OECD members are
expected to adhere relate to transnational criminal issues such as
20 1
money laundering and bribery.
Additionally, in a more realist hegemonic vein, incentives for
cooperation on crime control matters can be generated unilaterally by
powerful states that have the ability to create an array of carrots and
sticks to incentivize insourcing states to adopt minimum crime control
efforts. These measures can be economic, if the reduction of
transnational criminal activity is tied to financial aid or international
market access. In addition, unilateral acts can attempt to make use of
the normative power of powerful states. These efforts often focus on
shaming countries that behave in ways that create negative
externalities. 20 2 For instance, there are several blacklists and watch
lists operated by the United States that contain the names of all
countries engaging in illicit behavior. A concrete example of such a
200. See Press Release, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel to Join OECD (May 16,
2007), available at http://www.mfa.gov.ilfMFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Israel+to+join
+OECD+16-May-2007.htm.
201. See FATF, supra note 12 (an OECD initiative); see also Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, S. TREATY Doc. No.
105-43 (1997).
202. See, e.g., Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart Sanctions"Against Terrorism Wisely, 36
NEW ENG. L. REV. 957, 959-60 (2002); Jesse S.Morgan, Dirty Names, Dangerous Money: Alleged
Unilateralismin U.S. Policy on Money Laundering, 21 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 771 (2003); Daniel J.
Steinbock, Designatingthe Dangerous:From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 65,
117-18 (2006).
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unilateral policy can be found in U.S. policies regarding illicit drugs.
According to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act ("FRA"), the
President must submit to Congress an annual report identifying
states that serve as major centers for the production or distribution of
illicit drugs. 20 3 States included in this list can, as a result, lose fifty
20 4
percent of the financial support they receive from the United States.
In addition, according to the Act the executive director of each
multilateral development bank must vote against any loan or other
allocation of funds from his or her respective institution to any listed
state. 20 5 Another watch list example is the European Union's former
Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), which granted trade
preferences to states that pursued policies aimed at combating drug
206
production.
Unilateral policies such as the FRAA have both advantages
and disadvantages. The clearest advantage is their effectiveness.
Unilateral enforcement creates a clear decisionmaking process that
can impose substantial sanctions on nations that do not comply. Thus,
one can point to several states that reformed their policies as a direct
result of the threat of unilateral enforcement. In the area of human
trafficking, for example, Israel has amended its criminal code and has
begun to enforce this legislation as a result of its inclusion in the U.S.
State Department report. 20 7 This move can be explained by the threat
of decreased U.S. aid to Israel and by the shaming effect caused by the
inclusion in an official list of the U.S. State Department.
On the other hand, unilateral enforcement suffers from several
drawbacks that stem from the fact that it is conducted to serve the
hegemonic interests of the initiating state, and therefore will not
necessarily serve the interests of aggregate global welfare. First, in
many cases unilateral enforcement focuses only on issues that are of
interest to the initiating states. These can be economic interests, as is
203. 22 U.S.C. § 2291h(a)(3) (2006). Updated information on the application of the Act can be
found at the website of the State Department. U.S. Dep't of State, Narcotics Certification
Process, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/cl 1766.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
204. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(a)(1).
205. Id. § 2291j(a)(2).
206. See Robert Howse, India's WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the
European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major
Repercussions for "Political"Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 385, 385-87
(2003).
207. In 2006, Israel was put on a watch list prior to being categorized as a Tier 3 country in
the State Department's report on human trafficking. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS REPORT 46 (2006), availableat http://www.state.govdocuments/organization/66086.pdf.
Following this addition to the list, Israel amended its legislation on the matter and appointed a
special inter-office liaison in order to improve enforcement. See Ruth Eglash, Israel Still Falls
Short Over Human Trafficking Problem, JERUSALEM POST (Isr.), Nov. 20, 2007, at 4.
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the case with the strong emphasis the United States puts on enforcing
intellectual property rights, or other political interests, as is the case
with the pressure the United States puts on other states with respect
to illicit drugs. Yet a unilateral mechanism might circumvent this
balancing of interests and force a solution that is not necessarily
welfare maximizing.
Second, within the issues that are enforced unilaterally,
enforcement will be subject to the political interests of the enforcing
state. For example, the FRAA subjects the sanctioning regime of the
Act to the national interests of the United States. 20 8 The President has
routinely used this authority to sustain American financial aid to
countries listed as major centers of drug production and trafficking in
order to promote other interests, such as the war against communism
20 9
(in the past) and the war against terror (in the present).
An additional drawback of unilateral policymaking has to do
with its consequences on the domestic political landscape of the states
being pressured. Concepts such as sovereignty and national
independence might in themselves drive parties to oppose policies that
are adopted as a result of external pressure. Thus, policies that could
have been adopted voluntarily or multilaterally might run into
opposition if they are imposed solely because of other countries. For
instance, U.S. attempts, through various unilateral sanctions, to force
the Colombian government to change its drug policies achieved the
exact opposite result. Not only did the U.S. sanctions go unnoticed in
Colombia, but they served to weaken the Colombian government's
authoritativeness in the eyes of its citizens and of its drug traffickers
210
in particular.
Finally, states deal with insourcing problems unilaterally by
broadening their own criminal jurisdiction to regulate cross border
criminal activity. In this regard, one can see a growing tendency
among jurisdictions to prosecute individuals operating abroad for the
criminal consequences of their acts within the jurisdiction. For
example, U.S. authorities-either concerned about the corruptive
effect of online gambling on U.S. gaming patrons or alternatively
about the protection of land-based and other gaming services in the
United States-have pursued aggressive extraterritorial prosecutorial
policies against principals of offshore gambling enterprises who cater
208. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b)(1)(B) (creating a "vital national interest" exception to the
certification process).
209. See Jimmy Gurul6, The 1998 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances-A Ten Year Perspective: Is International Cooperation Merely
Illusionary?,22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 74, 86-87 (1998).
210. See Morgan, supra note 202, at 799-800.
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to U.S. customers. These efforts included the celebrated arrest,
prosecution, and extended jailing of Jay Cohen, an executive of an
Antigua-based Internet sports betting company. 2 11 They also included
the arrest of Peter Dicks, a British director of Sportingbet, an offshore
212
Internet sports betting company, while visiting the United States resulting in the closure of Sportingbet's online gaming activities in the
United States. 2 13 Finally, the efforts included the arrest of David
Carruthers, chief executive of Betonsports, another online gaming
to a settlement essentially abolishing this
website 214-leading
215
corporation's U.S. commercial operations from 2007 onwards.
IV. CONCLUSION

In this Article we presented a novel theory describing the
political economy of transnational crime control. The story we told was
one of growing global integration, which has given rise to various
externalities between nations pursuing their own crime control
interests. More specifically, we pointed out how different countries
might engage in both outsourcing and insourcing of certain types of
criminal activities, depending on their political structure and the
payoffs created by the relevant crimes. Thus, we argued that local
crime control policies are not designed and executed in a vacuum.
Rather, the policies adopted by one country (be they relatively harsh
or relatively lenient) affect the policies adopted by other countries.
The core of our positive analysis, namely, that crime control
policies of one country have spillover effects in other countries, led us
to evaluate the current state of transnational crime control. Our
analysis justified current practices aimed at regulating insourcing
countries that create harm in other countries in the form of setting
international minimum standards. Yet our analysis pointed towards a
less intuitive (and currently nonexistent) set of policies that should be
adopted to deal with the symmetric problem of outsourcing crime. We
pointed out that the international community should set out
maximum standards to limit the ability of nations to displace crime.

211. United States v. Cohen, 206 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002).
212. Simon Bowers & Andrew Clark, Sportingbet Arrest Threatens Internet Gambling,
GUARDIAN (Eng.), Sept. 9, 2006, at 29.
213. Dominic Walsh, Sportingbet Pays $400,000 to Call it Quits, TIMES (Eng.), Mar. 22, 2007,
at 53.
214. James Quinn, You Bet: Dallas Arrest Spoils the Party, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Eng.), July
22, 2006, at 35.
215. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Stephanie Saul, Gambling Subpoenas on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2007, at C1.
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While we remain tentative with respect to specific policy
recommendations, leaving those details for future research, the clear
conclusion drawn from our analysis is that the traditional concept of
state sovereignty over criminal justice must make way for new
concepts of international cooperation if efficient crime control is to be
achieved.

